

B. D. MURRAY

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Q. At half past two, Mr. Murray, there was conversation between the two of you as to whether you would get the crowd in? - A. Yes.

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Q. Would it be fair to say that that was a conversation that was very largely one of routine? - A. I think so.

Q. The sort of thing that would be said at most games, "Well, Bernard" - and I do not know whether he called you Bernard - A. Yes.

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Q. Perhaps in front of the other men he called you Superintendent Murray, I do not know? - A. No, he would call me by my Christian name.

Q. "Do you think we are going to get them in?" - A. Yes.

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Q. That sort of question would not suggest to you, would it, that there was Mr. Duckenfield concerned at that time as to whether he would get them in but it would be a routine sort of matter that would be discussed? - A. Yes, I think I was looking at the crowd and I could see the size of the crowd. I think I said to him as a matter of course, "There is a good crowd out there but we will get them in for three o'clock".

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Q. In fairness, Mr. Murray, as between the two of you, you were the man who had the experience over a year or so of the likelihood or the speed at which you would get a crowd in for three o'clock? - A. Yes.

Q. In those circumstances Mr. Duckenfield would have been very foolish, would he not, to be saying to you, "Despite your experience I think you are wrong"? - A. Possibly.

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Q. In any event, you certainly did not see any reason to be concerned at about the time that conversation took place? - A. No, I didn't.

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Q. Similarly there was a conversation about delaying the kick-off? - A. Yes.

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/Q. Again the sort of...

A Q. Again, the sort of conversation as between Controller and overall Commander which may well be regarded as routine? - A. Yes.

B Q. Especially in circumstances where the overall Commander has not been doing the job very long? - A. Yes.

Q. "Just remind me, Bernard, of the way we do these sort of things"? - A. That is right.

C Q. It was not a case, was it, of there being any real consideration at that time towards delaying the kick-off at about half-past-2? It just wasn't arising? - A. I don't think the question had arisen then. I think it was probably a mind crossing exercise of getting it right in his mind as to what we had said.

Q. What you were saying was no different from what you understood the position would be under Mr. Mole? - A. It was the criteria, if you like, that I had inherited from Mr. Mole or asked Mr. Mole about.

D Q. But there was no doubt between the two of you that if those criteria required safety to be taken into account, the safety of people either within or outwith the Ground, then that would play a very important part in any decision that was going to be made? - A. There were not any rules. There was nothing written down, or nothing that had to be adhered to; it was just what we had discussed and what we had agreed.

E Q. Just so that there is no misunderstanding about this, so that no one thinks there was any rigid rule, what you seemed to have been discussing at that stage was a situation where, forgetting any questions of safety, the only matter was whether people would be able to get in on time to see the game, and in those circumstances, if it was their own fault, then in a way tough luck. If it wasn't then other considerations may apply towards delaying the kick-off, but considerations of safety weren't entering into that particular balance, were they, at that stage? - A. Not at that stage. It seemed sensible that if people could not get to the event the kick-off would be delayed.

F Q. Certainly at that stage there was nothing that was being reported to you, and therefore to Mr. Duckenfield, from outside which suggested that there would be any risk to any fan or member of the public, so far as safety was concerned? - A. No.

G Q. It became very clear if I may say so, Mr. Murray, during the course of your evidence, that the crisis

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situation came upon the Control Box very suddenly. Now would that be right? - A. I am sure it was, yes.

- A**
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- Q. Had Mr. Marshall, before he made the request for reinforcements, so to speak, made clear to you what difficulties he was experiencing, or did that come out of the blue? - A. We could see obviously from the Control Room that there was a large crowd of people in the Leppings Lane.
- Q. Yes, but that is what you would expect? - A. But the fact that people were in great distress did come as a surprise.
- C**
- Q. Yes. There is all the difference in the world between, let us call it a public order situation where you expect the Commander outside to be dealing with it, and a situation where he is telling you, "People are going to die out here". Would you agree with that? - A. Absolutely.
- D**
- Q. Between his first request for reinforcements and the first request that the gates be opened, there was this, I was going to say difficulty, more than difficulty - I am not sure how you described it first of all, but the problem with the radios? - A. Yes, the problem with the radio, I think I described it as devastating, which it was.
- E**
- Q. That was the word I was looking for. Could we just go through why it was devastating? First of all, radio traffic was disrupted for a period? - A. Yes, it was.
- Q. That meant that people who just had normal messages to pass to you, never mind emergency messages, could not get through? - A. Well, certainly we couldn't answer anybody. The main one was that we could not answer anyone and anyone who called up would get no acknowledgments, and so would probably call again and again, and the air would very quickly become congested.
- F**
- Q. And what was happening when the air became congested - so five or six Officers were sending messages through at the same time? - A. Yes.
- Q. What sort of noise would that create within the Control Room? - A. It is not so much the noise, it is the distortion. It is bits of a message would get through and bits of another message would get through.
- G**
- Q. That is what you meant, so you are getting bits and pieces which make no sense at all? - A. Yes.
- H**

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- Q. This, of course, is distracting to those inside the Control Room, but in addition there was a disruption in the facility to actually send messages out once the thing had been halfway fixed, as I understand it? - A. Yes. It was fixed, was the idea, but it wasn't. It still didn't work after it had been fixed the first time.
- Q. So we then move from being able to use the proper equipment. You have got the standby equipment and then that has to be rejected, and you are on a hand held radio, the same as any of the ordinary PCs who may have had one? - A. That is correct. I think one cannot under-estimate the actual physical effect in the Control Room when everyone has to move, and the radio operator has to get under the desk. In fact, I think that Sergeant Goddard finished up in my chair and I finished up standing behind P.C. Ryan, as a result of the disruption.
- Q. What is the disadvantage - it may be obvious- of the Control Box only being able to use the same hand held radio as the ordinary serial? - A. When we have the proper powered set, we can override, in theory, anyone else who is transmitting a message, so if we want to send an urgent message out and someone else is transmitting in, our signal will override their signal to the person that we want to receive it. If we are in the situation of using the hand held radios, then everyone is competing for the same signal; we may lose out to other stations.
- Q. We then, as I understand it, get a message coming through from Mr. Marshall, the first set, for the gates to be opened? - A. Yes.
- Q. You told the Coroner, albeit that it was out of sequence, that at that time Mr. Bichard saw that the gate had, in fact, been opened. Let's not worry about how it was opened for the moment, but just at the time when Mr. Marshall's message - request - was coming through, he saw on the video, on the screen, the gate opening? - A. It was after. It must have been after. I can only assume, and I don't want to assume, but for some reason P.C. Bichard zeroed in, if you like, on that particular gate. It was after the first request had come in and I heard him say, "The gate's gone", or "The gate's burst".
- Q. I think that was it, "The gate's burst". So what we have is this, there is a request from Mr. Marshall asking for the gate to open which came out of the blue? - A. Yes.

- A
- Q. Because that was a request which was wholly contrary to the policy or the practice of policing a football game? - A. It was a unique request. We had made tannoy messages and sent resources round and extra horses, but the request for the gate to be opened was unheard of.
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- Q. It had changed from a public order situation outside to something completely different? - A. It had changed to a life or death situation outside.
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- Q. A short time thereafter, and it would appear to be a matter of seconds more than anything else from what you are saying, P.C. Bichard sees the gates burst open? - A. I honestly don't know the timescale, sir, but after the first request had come in.
- Q. Up to the time when the gate is seen to burst open no decision has been made, that is quite right, that is correct, isn't it? - A. That is correct, yes.
- D
- Q. After the gate burst open the situation seems to be retrieved in that, as we have seen on the video, a mounted Police Officer comes, closes off the inflow of people, and the gate is shut? - A. Yes, that is correct.
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- Q. May I ask you this, at that stage did it go through your mind, "Well, at least we don't have to make the decision as to whether to open the gate or not now, because it is quite clear that the gate doesn't need opening, otherwise the situation would not have been retrieved in the way it has. Mr. Marshall wouldn't have organised the closure of the gate". Did anything like that go through your mind? - A. I don't know, sir.
- F
- Q. Certainly that may well have appeared to be the case, may it not? Request to open the gate, gate opens, but Officer on the spot actually causes the gate to be closed, suggesting that whatever had required the gate to be opened in the first place had passed? - A. That is a possibility.
- Q. But then in the midst of the mayhem that you have been describing in the Control Room with the radio, Mr. Marshall's request comes again? - A. Yes.
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- Q. Would it be fair to say that on this occasion it wasn't so much of a request as an order? - A. To me the final one was a demand.
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- Q. And it sounded desperate? - A. There was no alternative.

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Q. Did you feel that you had any time to delay? - A. Not after that last request. I felt we had to do something there and then.

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Q. That was because people, he said, were going to be killed unless it was done? - A. Yes.

Q. You said to the Coroner, I think on Friday, "My own decision was that we had no more time"? - A. Yes.

Q. But again you were aware that it was a decision which was unprecedented so far as policing a football game was concerned? - A. Yes, it was.

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Q. Mr. Duckenfield did not make a decision immediately, did he? A matter of a number of seconds passed - I say seconds, as opposed to minutes. - A. Yes, as far as I can recall.

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Q. Do you recall this, that you asked him on two, perhaps three, occasions, "Mr. Duckenfield, are we going to open the gates?" - something like that? - A. I certainly asked him, yes.

Q. And on the third occasion, I suggest, he then agreed and said, "We must open the gates", or words to that effect? - A. I don't recall asking him several times.

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Q. Are you saying only once or are you saying it could be two or three times? - A. I feel it was only once.

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Q. Very well. Had he not

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- Q. Very well. Had he not made that decision, you would have made it? - A. I don't know, I can only speculate.
- Q. In a way, it was fortunate that it was not Mr. Mole who was in command on that day because Mr. Mole could have been anywhere? - A. If the match Ground Commander had not been in the Control Room, I would have asked him to attend there.
- Q. And with the radio difficulties? - A. It is very likely that we couldn't have got hold of him.
- Q. Superintendent Murray, I certainly am not going to be criticising anybody for the decision to open the gates. Mr. Duckenfield was the one who gave the order and, apart from Mrs. McBrien, I have not heard anybody actually at this Inquest criticise the opening of the gates. Had you, being there listening to the decision being made to open the gates, considered - and we know you did not consider it because you have answered Mr. Payne's question - that there was any serious risk to the fans on the Leppings Lane terrace as a result of the decision to open the gates, would you have done something about it? - A. I am sorry, I lost you half-way through the question.
- Q. Let me try and explain it again. You told Mr. Payne that you did not consider that there was any risk of injury to those in the central pens as a result of opening the gates? - A. Yes, I didn't think about that at all.
- Q. You told him, and I accept it unequivocally, that you were not indifferent to any risk of injury to those people. What I am asking you is this. Had you considered that there was a risk to the people on the Leppings Lane terrace in Pens 3 and 4 as a result of the decision to open the gates, what would you have done? - A. Of course I hadn't considered it.
- Q. You would have done something about it, would you not? - A. One moment, sir.
- THE CORONER: Take your time.
- THE WITNESS: Of course.
- Q. MR. ISAACS: Of course you would have done something about it. - A. Yes.
- Q. Are you all right? - A. Yes.

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MR. ISAACS: I should have said all these questions Mr. Murray is not obliged to answer. He does do and I am grateful for doing so.

- Q. You would have had, would you not, full authority to do whatever you considered necessary at that stage to avert any risk to anybody in the ground as a result of opening the gates? - A. Yes.
- Q. In the same way as Mr. Mole was telling us had he made the decision there should be an evacuation as a result of a bomb scare and you would have taken consequential decisions, in this situation you had the authority to do what you considered to be necessary? - A. Yes, I would have.
- Q. You would not have needed Mr. Duckenfield to tell you what to do? - A. No, I wouldn't.
- Q. Is this the position, Mr. Murray? In the crisis that faced the Control Room at that time, everybody was doing, so far as you could see, their best to deal with it? - A. Yes sir.
- Q. I know that with hindsight one can put forward things that could, or should, or might have been done, but had those things occurred to you at the time in the crisis you would have done them? - A. Of course.

MR. ISAACS: Thank you very much indeed. Perhaps, sir, that is a convenient moment to have a break.

THE CORONER: I think that will be a very good idea. We will break for 10 minutes.

(Short Adjournment)

Cross-Examined by MR. KING:

- Q. Mr. Murray, you were Ground Control? - A. Yes.
- Q. And in overall command there was Mr. Duckenfield? - A. Yes.
- Q. Can I just for the moment deal with the role of Commanding Officers generally, rather than distinguishing between the two of you for the moment on this line of questions. I will distinguish between the two of you in a moment. I just want to understand what you are saying as to the function of Command Officers at a football game, or indeed at any event. You have beneath you a number of more junior Officers, do you not? - A. Yes.

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Q. Overall you had Mr. Duckenfield? - A. I see Mr. Duckenfield being in command of the event and the four Superintendents having their own individual spheres of responsibility.

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Q. So be it. I accept that for the moment. Were you aware of the existence of something called a Green Guide? - A. Yes.

Q. Did you have a copy of it? - A. I did not have a copy of it, no.

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Q. Have you ever been provided with a copy of it? - A. I have not been provided with a copy of it but I have read it.

Q. This is nothing to do with these Inquests because I am looking to the future for the moment, but just very quickly, since the disaster have you still been involved in policing football matches? - A. I policed three football matches following.

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Q. You have not even been supplied with a Green Guide since then?

MR. MANNING: I do not know whether that is a question that is going to help us.

MR. KING: So be it:

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Q. Did you nonetheless consider it important before taking part even in the planning meetings to acquaint yourself with the Green Guide? - A. I read the Green Guide about twelve or eighteen months before that semi-final.

Q. And not again? - A. I do not think so, sir.

Q. Did Mr. Duckenfield, to your knowledge, have a copy of the Green Guide? -A. I do not know.

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Q. Nonetheless let me show you a copy of the Green Guide for the moment to see if I can jog your memory about its contents.

MR. BEECHEY: That is C.382, sir.

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Q. MR. KING: Just out of interest, how was it you came into possession of the Green Guide when you did look at it some twelve months or so before 1989? - A. I read it when I was at Barnsley as Chief Inspector.

Q. It was March, 1988 when you came into your senior position, if I can put it that way, with regard to the

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filling of the pens compared with what they did at a league match? - A. I have never said that.

- A**
- B**
- Q. What responsibility did exactly the Police take on board at a semi-final, according to you, as regards monitoring the distribution and filling of the pens across the whole terrace? - A. At a semi-final the whole terrace was open.
- Q. I know that. - A. The Police, the Control Room, Police Officers in general, had a responsibility for monitoring and filling the pens.
- C**
- Q. So you accept that there was a responsibility upon the Police at the 1989 semi-final, albeit the whole terrace had been thrown wide open, to monitor the build-up, do you, and the filling of the pens across the terrace before kick-off? - A. I have just said that it is a shared responsibility by all the Police Officers present and also by the Club.
- D**
- Q. Do you accept that the Police had that responsibility, yes or no?
- THE CORONER: I think he has said it several times, Mr. King.
- MR. KING: I am sorry.
- THE CORONER: He has given his reply and we must accept it.
- E**
- MR. KING: So be it:
- Q. The Club management were not in the Police Control Box, were they? - A. No, they weren't.
- Q. You in the Police Control Box had access to the following, didn't you? First of all you were able to look out of the windows to view specifically the state of the Leppings Lane Terraces? - A. Yes.
- F**

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/Q. I think everybody

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and I had seen the system work. I had seen the terrace spread. I had seen the centre pens fill up first and the raised area.

B Q. I accept that. What I want to know is whether as part of your monitoring, not that there would necessarily come this time but there might come the time when you are monitoring the terraces, that the centre pens would be full and you would want to divert people to the side pens? - A. I think there may well have come a time when that was necessary, yes.

C Q. That is fairly obvious from the fact that the centre pens are the popular pens? - A. It is not obvious because it happened before. It would be exactly the same, the people had spread right across.

Q. You misunderstand me. It is obvious that it might happen? Not that it did happen or was going to happen definitely, but it might happen? - A. It may have been necessary, depending on the amount of people there and the way the crowd was spread, to take some action.

D Q. Do you know Mr. Lock? - A. Yes, I know Mr. Lock.

Q. Mr. Lock, of course, had carried on your role on an earlier occasion some years before? - A. Yes, he had.

E Q. When you came in 1988 you were able to speak to him because he then had a capacity with the club, did he not? - A. I saw him in his capacity as working for Sheffield Wednesday Football Club.

F Q. Do you accept, therefore, that as regards the monitoring of the crowd at a semi-final that it was necessary to keep an eye on the pens, and the filling of the pens, so that if it were necessary to close off the centre pens and feed people into the side pens, that could be organised? - A. I think at any event it is necessary to keep an eye on what is going on, and if one sees a particular problem to do something about it.

G Q. I am sorry, I want to ask you whether you had turned your mind in advance in 1989 specifically to the Leppings Lane terraces to the possible need, before any signs of distress, before any pressures had arisen to such dangerous proportions there was distress, but at a time when the centre pens were, shall I say, comfortably full and there was plenty of space in the side pens, did you turn your mind to the fact there might come a time, a need, to divert people away from the centre pens to the side pens? - A. No, I did not consider that at all.

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A
Q. An agreement sounds as if in advance it has been worked out a policy as to when you would delay kick-off and that is fair, isn't it? - A. I would say that by agreed I meant it was something that we had discussed before.

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Q. And it is a fact, isn't it, that all you told Mr. Duckenfield as regards this agreement was that there had to be a specific reason, an identifiable problem for people not arriving, before you would delay kick-off? That was the gist of what you were saying, wasn't it? - A. I told him that was the usual situation with delaying kick-off as far as I was aware.

C
Q. There was no suggestion that you would abandon the policy if in fact, albeit people had come too late through their own fault, they were in difficulties outside? There was no mention of that, was there? - A. I don't think it was ever a rigid policy, it was the only circumstances, the only thing I knew about when kick-off would be delayed.

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Q. Since we are dealing with kick-off, do you remember - you do remember, don't you - an invitation or suggestion from, I think, P.C. Buxton that kick-off be delayed? - A. Yes, sir, I recall that.

Q. You told us that you thought that had come after the gates had been opened? - A. I feel it must have.

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Q. Why do you say it must have? - A. Because of the timing of it and the fact the players were coming onto the pitch.

Q. I say that because, I only put it to you, that you could be quite wrong about that, on the basis - and I don't know if you were at the Inquest when P.C. Buxton gave his evidence? - A. No, I wasn't.

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MR. KING: Sir, I think it is important that I put this:

Q. P.C. Buxton's evidence was that it was several minutes after his request to delay kick-off that he saw that the crowd was being relieved outside the turnstiles by the opening of the gates? - A. I can only accept that when I heard that message was when Sergeant Goddard replied immediately, "It's too late now, the players are on the field".

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Q. Let me accept that for a moment. Why would it just be too late because the players were on the field? Why does that make it automatically too late to delay kick-off? - A. It was too late in those circumstances, I

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feel, that presumably P.C. Buxton wanted the kick-off delayed for whatever reason I don't know.

- A**
- B**
- Q. To say "for some reason I don't know", you were aware by that time, whatever it was, that there had been a very large problem outside the turnstile area at Leppings Lane, weren't you? - A. There is no doubt that if we could have communicated to that crowd outside the turnstiles that the kick-off had been delayed, and if they had taken any notice of that communication, it may have had an effect.
- C**
- Q. Mr. Murray, I want to take it in stages. I want to know why at the time you say it was, whenever it was, that it was just too late to delay kick-off, merely because the players were on the pitch? - A. It wasn't merely because the players were on the pitch, it was because the gates were open and the crowd had come in by unauthorised means.
- D**
- Q. I understood - I may have totally misunderstood- that you were saying, and that was the communication of Sergeant Goddard, it was too late because the players were on the pitch, so it is nothing to do with the players being on the pitch then, it was too late? - A. No. It doesn't make any difference whether the players were on the pitch or not, apart from the fact that once the players come out a cheer goes up naturally, and it would be extremely difficult to try and convince anybody after that stage that you had delayed the kick-off.
- E**
- Q. But it is a fact, isn't it, Mr. Murray, that you should not refuse to delay kick-off merely because the players are on the pitch, if there is a crushing situation outside? - A. I think I have already said that there aren't any hard and fast rules at all about delaying kick-off. There are no limitations. A kick-off can be delayed whenever, for whatever reason.
- F**
- Q. Would you not agree that the statement, "It is too late to delay kick-off, the players are already on the pitch" sounds like just the application of a rigid policy? - A. No, I don't.
- Q. You don't, all right. Let me move on in time

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MR. MANNING: In that case, sir, can we call time?

THE CORONER: Yes - 10-past-3.

(Short Adjournment)

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B. D. MURRAY

was in charge of the Control Box. I would be looking at the crowd. I would be looking at everything. I would be looking all around.

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- Q. I cannot press it any further than this. It is your evidence and we must assess it, but you are saying that nothing registered with you at all between 2.30 and, shall we say, quarter-to 3 as to the distribution of the spectators between the centre pens and the side pens? - A. I think what I said was that nothing caused me concern. I would only qualify that by saying I do not know what effect or how long the Control Room was disrupted when the radio went down.
- Q. The radio was out of operation from - I do not want to put words into your mouth. How long would you say, in terms of minutes, was the radio out of operation in the Control Box? - A. I don't know, but I think I have estimated it between a minute, two minutes. It could be longer, I do not know.
- Q. May it seem a long time, but a relatively short time? - A. I consider it was a short time. I don't know how long.
- Q. There is a message, is there not, which is logged at 2.42 where PC Bichard is radioing, I think, to Force Control outside the ground at Hammerton Road and is saying the radio is down? - A. Yes, I have seen that message.
- Q. So that pinpoints it at 2.42? - A. Which is between 2.30 and 2.45.
- Q. Certainly the radio was back in business by the time Mr. Marshall made his first request for the gates to be opened? - A. I think so, yes.
- Q. I just want to return briefly to make sure I understand your evidence as to the distribution of the fans. You did not see anything unusual which caused you concern, but could you tell us this. It did register, did it, that the centre pens were clearly fuller than the side pens? - A. Yes.
- Q. Did it register with you - this is between 2.30 and quarter-to 3 - that the centre pens were markedly more full than the side pens? - A. I think that the centre pens and the north-west terrace were fuller than the other parts of the terrace. I wouldn't say that the centre pens were any fuller than the north-west terrace or vice-versa.

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Q. You know of nothing yourself to tell us about which gives you any reason to think you did not have the manpower - if it had been so decided - the manpower to utilise before Gate C was opened, or any of the gates were opened, for the purpose of closing off the tunnel, directing fans and so forth? - A. I think I could probably have got the manpower to attempt to do that task and got them down to the tunnel in time if it had crossed my mind.

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Q. Before the order for the gates to be opened, it was known to you in the Control Box that there was a large crowd in the enclave outside the turnstile area at the Leppings Lane end? -A. Yes, I could see there was a large crowd outside.

Q. You were in a position at that stage, in the five minute period between 2.47 and 2.52, to observe the state of the West Terraces, weren't you? - A. I was in a position to be able to observe them, yes.

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Q. To be fair to you, Mr. Duckenfield in the Control Box was in a position to look first of all at the monitor showing the Leppings Lane turnstiles, wasn't he? -A. He was in the same situation as I was.

Q. Just as you could see there was a large crowd outside, you have no reason to doubt that he also could see it, have you? - A. No, I have no reason to doubt it.

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Q. You were in a position from the Control Box to see the state of the Leppings Lane terraces and Mr. Duckenfield was too? - A. I would think we could both have looked at the terraces and seen the state of them, yes.

Q. If I can just show you for a moment photographs 509, and 511 - 509 is probably the best we are going to do for about this time.

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MR. GRIFFITHS: C.509, sir.

Q. MR. KING: Mr. Murray, this is a photograph which shows at 2.52, all right? - A. Yes.

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Q. I would have liked to have shown you one at 2.51, but that is the best I can do. I need to show you C.511 and C.326.A for the purpose of looking at the side pens. Just look at 511, which is two minutes later. - A. Yes.

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Q. I am sorry, I will have to.....

B. D. MURRAY

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Q. I am sorry but I will have to come back to 509 for a moment. On 509 we can see the beginnings of the wing pen, pen 6? - A. Yes, we can.

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Q. On 509 all we can see is a corner of it but such corner as we can see clearly, it would be fair to say, it looks as if it is almost completely empty apart from two or three people? - A. It looks very sparse in that particular part I can see on this film.

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Q. Again under the Control Box the area leading into pen 1 and leading into pen 2, although there is clearly more people at the back again it looks very sparse to the side of pen 1 and down to the front? - A. Yes, there are less people there but that is the part of the ground where I expect there to be less people.

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Q. I accept that. Then to 511 we get a better view of pen 6 two minutes later? - A. Yes.

Q. If we can move to 326A we get an even better view of pen 6 at some five minutes later? - A. Yes.

Q. Going back to the position just before the order was given to order the gates to be opened, because we know gate C was opened at 2.52, if one looked at the west terraces it would be clear that pen 6 had marked empty spaces in it? - A. From where that photograph is taken, yes.

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Q. Even without the photograph, the position on the photograph, it must have been obvious, must it not, from your use of the cameras you had from the Control Box that pen 6 was markedly empty? That was not difficult to see, was it? - A. From the views that we were getting from the cameras, from the views that I could see from the Control Room, it wasn't obvious.

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Q. At the end of the day that will be a matter of evidence. You are saying that from the Control Box with your use of the videos, the cameras, and you had the ability to look along as we have already described? - A. I think you have got to look at the individual cameras. I think the colour camera was unfortunately focussed on the problem area in the Kop and that is where it stayed until about three o'clock. The camera on the gantry next to the Control Box was unfortunately not working up to its potential. I do not know how that affected it but I can see from the angle that that photograph is taken, 326A, yes, there is a lot of room on the front of pen 6 but I didn't have that view and if I had had that view it might have affected my decisions.

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B. D. MURRAY

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B Q. If you had had that view, which decision would have been affected? - A. I don't know.

THE CORONER: I think that is hypothetical.

C Q. MR. KING: Before the gates were opened, if one looked at the west terraces, would you accept this much or not; that there was an obvious difference between the state of the centre pens and the side pens, would you have said that much? - A. I think I have said that there were a lot more people in the centre pens and the north west terrace than there were in the other parts of the terrace.

D Q. You have agreed with me that there was a large crowd outside the gates? - A. Yes, there was a large crowd of people outside the gates.

Q. In respect of which the order was about to given for them to be opened? - A. Yes.

Q. Once in the concourse area, whichever gates were opened, those people had to go somewhere, did they not? - A. Yes, they had to get into the concourse first away from the crush.

Q. Then they had to go somewhere into the ground, did they not? - A. Yes.

E Q. This is a question you do not have to answer. Before the order for the gates to be opened was made did you ask yourself the question, "Where are these people going to go when we open the gates?" - A. I can't recall asking myself the question. All I can recall is trying to relieve the injury and suffering that was taking place outside the gates in the concourse in the enclave in front of the turnstiles. That was the problem.

F Q. It must have been obvious to anybody who turned his mind to the question of what was going to happen after the gates had been opened that those people had to go somewhere on to the terraces? - A. What was obvious to me is that we had a terrible problem outside. Experienced Officers were letting us know that people were being injured, likely to be killed. We had never had anything like it before. There was tremendous pressure to take a course of action to relieve that and that course of action was taken. Nothing else was obvious.

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- Q. You would know that it was no part, under the Operational Order, of any of your serials specifically to direct spectators sideways. You would know that? -
A. There was nothing in the Order to say that, no.
- Q. I don't want to waste time but are you really saying even in the five minutes when gate C was opened that it wasn't obvious then that that throng were heading straight for the tunnel and the centre pens? - A. Do you think I would have done nothing about it if I had known that that was going to be the case, or if it had been obvious to me that was going to be the case? Do you think I would have done nothing about it if anybody had brought it to my attention?
- Q. If it had been obvious that they were going to the tunnel and the centre pens, what would you have done about it? - A. I don't know. I feel I might have got in touch with the Officer in charge of that area and asked him to deflect. I honestly don't know.
- Q. Why would you have wanted to do something about it.

THE CORONER: No.

MR. MANNING: Are we not back really one question down the line to where I intervened before?

MR. KING: I am sorry, it is a legitimate line of reasoning. If this Officer is saying, "If I had known they were going towards the tunnel I would have done something about it", to ask why he would have done something about it?

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THE CORONER: It is a legitimate and an interesting point but it does not, I think, advance the object of this Inquest, and that is simply, Mr. King, that this Officer has said that he did not do anything about it, that is fair enough. You have asked him, and I didn't object to that, whether it wasn't obvious to him that something needed to be done. His response was that if it had been obvious to him he would undoubtedly have done something. Now the next question, which is what we are talking about, "What would you have done?", doesn't advance matters any further forward. I did allow the first one but I am not going to allow a whole string of questions as to what could have been

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MR. KING: Sir, with respect, that wasn't my question. My question was if it had been obvious to him they were going to the tunnel why he would have done something about it, what