

<p>1 Thursday, 25 February 2016 2 (10.00 am) 3 IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY 4 Summing-up (continued) 5 THE CORONER: Members of the jury, good morning. 6 I was summarising the evidence of Ms Nicol, the 7 officer on the pitch perimeter track. I think it would 8 be helpful if we just had a look at one of 9 the chronologies which we have not yet looked at. It is 10 in tab 7 in your green file, obviously, and it is headed 11 "Events of the day after kick-off. The emergency 12 response". 13 It contains, as you can see if you look at the top 14 of page 1, the timing for the kick-off, the photograph 15 showing gates 3, 4 and 5 open at a time when the 16 scoreboard clock records 2.59, 14:59. It records when 17 Chief Inspector McRobbie makes his way from the police 18 control box onto the pitch via the south stand, and at 19 3 o'clock, PC Richardson, as she is there called, opens 20 gate 1, spectators are admitted into the pen from the 21 pitch side. Chief Inspector McRobbie is shown arriving 22 at the gate very shortly after it is opened and ushering 23 fans in front of pen 2 through the gate. 24 It goes on, and I am not going to go through the 25 whole of it, members of the jury, but you may find it</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 1</p>	<p>1 that she was not allowed to open the gate. She, 2 however, did so, when she saw that one of the lads 3 looked very upset. 4 You may think, members of the jury, that the scout 5 group had been in pen 3, although Ms Nicol thought it 6 was pen 2, but pen 2 was plainly not crowded. 7 Having opened the gate to what must have been pen 3, 8 you may think, Ms Nicol thought she left it open, or did 9 not close it properly. She walked the scout group 10 towards the area of pens 1 and 2. You will recall from 11 the AV footage seeing that group of scouts sitting on 12 what were described as stools next to or by the 13 St John Ambulance officers. 14 Ms Nicol said that, as she looked back, she saw more 15 and more people had come out onto the track. There was, 16 she thought, another police officer standing by the 17 gate, trying to shut it. She went back to try to help. 18 She said she saw a man's face in the crowd. She said: 19 "It was just terror. It was just a matter of 20 pulling them out." 21 Ms Nicol said she tried to divert the fans onto the 22 pitch perimeter track, and we saw that, did we not, on 23 the AV material. She said the people she first saw on 24 the track seemed fine. She opened gate 1 and started 25 directing people through it.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 3</p>
<p>1 helpful, because it puts in simple chronological order 2 the various events, and I am obviously going to 3 summarise Ms Nicol's evidence, but you can get the 4 timings very conveniently from this document. If you 5 turn over to page 2, it describes the various events. 6 For example, at 15:02, that the St John Ambulance 7 person, Mr Saxton, walking from the position next to 8 gate 1 towards the central pens. 9 I am not going to run through the whole of this, but 10 I thought it would be helpful just to indicate to you 11 that this is, you may think, a very convenient summary 12 of events, putting them overall into chronological 13 order. 14 If you turn just to page 3, you will see at 15:04 -- 15 I have mentioned it pretty frequently now -- the attempt 16 on goal by Peter Beardsley at the Spion Kop end, the 17 second entry on page 3. 18 So that is, you may think, a pretty convenient 19 document for when you are looking at events after 20 3 o'clock, in a straightforward form. 21 Returning to Ms Nicol, as I am going to call her, 22 you may remember that she was rather confused about gate 23 and pen numbers. At some point, she described talking 24 to a scout leader. He asked if the group could come 25 out, because it was getting a bit crowded. She told him</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 2</p>	<p>1 Chief Inspector McRobbie we know came down. We know 2 that Mr Duckenfield had sent him. Ms Nicol said that 3 she did not know Mr McRobbie or that he was a police 4 officer. She only learnt that, she said, at the 5 Taylor Inquiry. 6 In her statement of 17 April 1989, she described 7 Mr McRobbie as a club official, and she said Mr McRobbie 8 was trying to push people off the pitch onto the 9 perimeter track. We could see what he did by looking at 10 the AV footage. She said that she didn't recall 11 Mr McRobbie talking to her, but we can see what happened 12 if we look at the footage, and, Jyo, please, it is 13 clip 3. This is footage from 14:59:56 to 15:01. It is 14 from police camera 37. Mr McRobbie can be seen jogging 15 down from the south stand to the perimeter track via 16 pen 1. Ms Nicol can be seen ushering people into pen 1 17 from the perimeter track, with Mr McRobbie assisting. 18 It may be you think that about a dozen people are on the 19 perimeter track in front of pen 1. So let's just look 20 at that. 21 (Video played) 22 THE CORONER: Ms Nicol said that the first few fans were 23 quite happy to go into gate 1. They did not say 24 anything about any kind of medical emergency or that 25 anything was seriously wrong, was happening in the pens.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 4</p>

<p>1 A couple may have said it was a bit crushed in there, 2 but there was nothing urgent in any of them.</p> <p>3 As they were coming down, they were more and more 4 distressed, she said. They were having difficulty 5 breathing. At that point, she said she did not really 6 care about the football game. She was just letting 7 people walk where they wanted. Mr McRobbie, she said, 8 was trying to keep them off the pitch side. She saw 9 a bit of shuffling and pushing and shoving. A fan came 10 up to her and threatened to hit Mr McRobbie. She said 11 there were definitely people in distress. She said she 12 was more interested in them. She turned to the fan who 13 had said that about hitting Mr McRobbie, "So hit him".</p> <p>14 It was quite obvious to her that the people who were 15 coming out onto the perimeter track were not coming out 16 to cause trouble. They were not trying to get onto the 17 pitch. "There was no aggravation at all from any of 18 the fans". She said they weren't trying to get onto the 19 pitch, they were all being friendly and walking down 20 towards her.</p> <p>21 Ms Nicol went up to pen 3. Other police officers 22 were there by then. On the AV footage she identified 23 someone who was likely to be her standing on the fencing 24 on the far left looking at pen 3 at 15:08.</p> <p>25 Members of the jury, let's look at that bit of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 5</p>	<p>1 Ms Nicol said she did not notice whether there were 2 any other senior officers on the pitch. She did not 3 think the organisation of the removal of fans was going 4 very well. The gate was too small. She did not go to 5 the gate because there were quite a few officers and 6 fans around it. They were colliding with each other, 7 trying to pull people out.</p> <p>8 She said she did not push fans back. She did not 9 see any of her colleagues doing so. She never saw the 10 gate to pen 3 opening and shutting. She never saw the 11 gate shut. She said, "We were all too late ... 12 everybody realised far too late".</p> <p>13 Mr Menon put to Ms Nicol that ultimately the senior 14 officers in the police control box had overall 15 responsibility because of their bird's-eye view of 16 the central pens, and she said, "I would have thought 17 that was their role, yes".</p> <p>18 From the AV material, members of the jury, we know 19 that Ms Nicol was ushering fans into pen 1 at between 20 14:59 and 15:03. She was asked when she became aware 21 there was a medical emergency. She said it was after 22 she started letting people into pen 1. Mr Menon put to 23 her that that was a process that started at around 24 14:53, 2.53, the time at which she said so in her 1989 25 account, that she let the scouts out of pen 3. She</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 7</p>
<p>1 footage and I will then tell you what she said. Clip 4, 2 please, Jyo.</p> <p>3 (Video played)</p> <p>4 THE CORONER: Perhaps we just might see that again.</p> <p>5 Ms Nicol said she was sure the gate was opened. 6 There were "dozens of people just completely squashed 7 against the fencing". There were people on top of 8 people. Nobody could get out of the gate. The gate was 9 completely blocked. She said:</p> <p>10 "I climbed up onto the perimeter fence and I could 11 clearly see a space towards the back ... I was 12 screaming, 'Move back, move back' ... the people towards 13 the back didn't seem to know what was happening. They 14 were still looking towards the other direction, which 15 I presumed was the football match going on ..."</p> <p>16 She said the reason she shouted "get back" was 17 because another police officer had shouted, "Move back, 18 move back".</p> <p>19 Ms Nicol told the Taylor Inquiry that when they were 20 starting to pull people out, she did not know why. She 21 said it was only when she saw the sheer terror on 22 somebody's face that she began to realise that something 23 seriously wrong was happening. It was rather later that 24 she saw what she later described as a pile of bodies in 25 pen 3.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 6</p>	<p>1 accepted that timing. She did not think then that it 2 was a medical emergency, she said. She knew that 3 something was amiss. People were coming out in 4 distress.</p> <p>5 When shown her evidence to the Taylor Inquiry by 6 Ms Richards, she accepted it was not until after she 7 began pulling people out of pen 3 that she realised that 8 something serious was definitely wrong.</p> <p>9 I am now going to turn to Ms Nicol's account of 10 events after the day. Ms Nicol did not go to work on 11 the Sunday. She did on the Monday. During that day, 12 she was asked, she said, to go to Snig Hill, police 13 headquarters. She was shown up to the fourth floor. 14 That was where the senior officers had their offices. 15 Members of the jury, you will recall that she was 16 a police constable of, I think I'm right in saying, some 17 four years' experience at the time.</p> <p>18 There was a team of people in the foyer. They asked 19 her to put in a report about her experiences at the 20 game. They said it was so that whoever came to 21 investigate would know where each officer was, what they 22 did. They said it was not a statement. It was just 23 a brief outline of what happened on the day. She was 24 sent into a small windowless room, given some plain 25 paper and told to write on it. She said she remembered</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 8</p>

1 asking what sort of things they wanted her to write.
 2 They laid out, she said, a list of things: what serial
 3 she was in; what time she was on duty; who she was with;
 4 things like that. She could not recall being given any
 5 instructions about what not to include.
 6 Ms Nicol said she was in the room for quite some
 7 time. Other plain clothes officers kept coming in,
 8 reading what she was writing, or taking it away; she
 9 said, "obviously reading it outside ... they kept
 10 shutting the door on me, so I don't know what the
 11 conversation was".
 12 She said she understood one officer was a chief
 13 superintendent. He was the one who spoke to her first.
 14 She did not know any of the other officers. She was
 15 quite, she said, overwhelmed:
 16 "They told me to add this, or 'Did you see this?',
 17 or, 'Did you see that?'. Not add specific things. They
 18 did not tell me what to write, they just said, 'Did this
 19 happen? Or did anything happen that you can talk [to
 20 us] about?'.
 21 Ms Nicol explained that in the statement which she
 22 made the gate numbers that she referred to were
 23 confused, and where, as it did, in the statement it
 24 said, "Gates 1 to 4 half full", she was intending to
 25 refer to gates 1 and 2, which were, she said, half full.

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1 Where it said, "Gates 2 to 3, three-quarters full", this
 2 was a reference, she said, to gates 3 and 4. She
 3 recalled, she said, writing that they were "full", not
 4 "three-quarters full", as it states.
 5 Ms Nicol said, and this is referring in part to her
 6 statement:
 7 "I wrote 'full' ... I put the word 'full' and on one
 8 of the occasions when they came in to read it and then
 9 brought it back again, I was asked to look at the word
 10 'full' and to say if it was full and how could I tell it
 11 was full from where I was standing. It's not an
 12 amendment. I have not crossed it out. I actually
 13 rewrote the page rather than crossed it out. That's not
 14 because I was told to rewrite the page. It's because
 15 I've got terrible handwriting and I would have tried to
 16 make it look neater."
 17 She said that that particular wording was picked up
 18 on:
 19 "As I said, they used to take what I were writing
 20 out and come back in again. And that particular
 21 wording, the word 'full' -- it made sense to me at the
 22 time from where I was -- obviously I couldn't see the
 23 pens very well and using the word 'full' means they
 24 were, like, packed out, extremely full, and they
 25 weren't, because there was still movement in the crowd

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1 so people could still move around. I did agree that
 2 they weren't -- it was -- I think it was the use of
 3 the grammar of the word 'full' more than anything else.
 4 But I couldn't think of any other word to put, that's
 5 why I've put three-quarters full ..."
 6 She said there was discussion as to whether or not
 7 she could see from where she was whether the pens were
 8 full. She said that three-quarters was just a figure
 9 that she used:
 10 "When I look at it now", she said, "that's not
 11 right. I would have said it was fuller, the fullest,
 12 but not over[full]."
 13 She said that at the time what the officer was
 14 saying to her made sense. She was not told what to
 15 write or what to put in the document, but it was the
 16 environment she was in at the time, on her own in the
 17 room. It was not very pleasant. She finally said to
 18 Ms Lambert she felt uncomfortable. The circumstances
 19 were probably intimidating.
 20 She said that the change of "full" to
 21 "three-quarters full" in her statement has bothered her
 22 for the last 20-odd years. She said she was not forced,
 23 but encouraged, to change it.
 24 Members of the jury, she was asked some other
 25 questions about the statement, and, in effect, she

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1 said -- I don't think we need look at it -- that we
 2 should transpose gate 3 for gate 2, at one stage. She
 3 was a little uncertain about it later on. She
 4 subsequently wrote a document correcting it. There was
 5 a degree of confusion, you may think, in her mind about
 6 the different gates and the numbers of the different
 7 gates.
 8 She said that she subsequently wrote a document
 9 correcting it, which they took away. They asked her to
 10 come outside. They had a plan of the football ground.
 11 They were confused about her numbering of the gates, and
 12 she wrote a second statement.
 13 Members of the jury, in the second statement, made
 14 on the same day, after discussion with the officers,
 15 they wrote down the names of the pens, for example --
 16 and I don't think we need trouble to look at it --
 17 "south pen", which was not how she would have referred
 18 to the pen.
 19 Members of the jury, whether the second statement in
 20 fact clarifies the first is a matter for you. Although
 21 entirely for you, you may think it important to bear in
 22 mind which pens were in fact full and which pens were
 23 not, when deciding which particular pen Ms Nicol was
 24 referring to at any particular time.
 25 Ms Nicol said that she believed that she and

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<p>1 Police Constable Smith and Police Constable Illingworth 2 seemed to be picked out, scapegoated, she said, by the 3 hierarchy of the South Yorkshire Police in the lead-up 4 to the Taylor Inquiry. She believed, she said, there 5 was an attempt to divert the blame from what happened 6 onto the officers on the ground and the fans.</p> <p>7 PC Walpole was a community officer and part of 8 serial 1. He regularly policed Hillsborough. He 9 estimated that he had been on duty for some hundred 10 games before 15 April. That day, she was working facing 11 the north stand, approximately halfway between the west 12 stand and the halfway line.</p> <p>13 As to the briefing, he said he understood that 14 no-one would go onto the track without authority from 15 the police control box. In a medical emergency, 16 commonsense would be used. In his 2013 17 Operation Resolve statement, he said this about the 18 briefing:</p> <p>19 "I can't remember exactly what was said, but I can 20 clearly remember Mr Duckenfield saying, under no 21 circumstances will fans be allowed onto the track and 22 the match will kick off at 3 pm and won't be delayed 23 under any circumstances."</p> <p>24 He said he remembered that clearly. He said he 25 thought it surprising, because you never know what is</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 13</p>	<p>1 that came over. He heard from Marshall, 2 Superintendent Marshall, whose voice he said he 3 recognised, very distressed. He said "He radioed 4 through saying there were thousands of fans arrived 5 pretty late on, and there was a boundary wall swaying 6 and he thought that that might collapse and he felt that 7 someone might be killed and he was asking for ... a gate 8 to be opened to relieve the pressure."</p> <p>9 Mr Walpole said he heard Mr Marshall repeat this 10 three times over the next five minutes. He could not 11 remember whether Sergeant Goddard in the control room 12 said, "Stand by" or if the radio was just quiet. After 13 the third request, he said Sergeant Goddard came over 14 the radio and his words were, "If it looks like someone 15 might be killed, then we'll have to open the gates". 16 Mr Walpole said he heard those words very clearly. It 17 went through his mind that Mr Duckenfield would no doubt 18 delay the kick-off, as it was, in his view, as he put 19 it, "a no brainer".</p> <p>20 In his 2013 Operation Resolve statement, Mr Walpole 21 said that he "remembered thinking, they must be going to 22 shut the gates into the tunnel because there was no more 23 room in the central pens". He told us that he presumed 24 that the police officers at the Leppings Lane end would 25 disperse the crowds to the sides. He said it would have</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 15</p>
<p>1 going to happen at a football match. It was quite 2 clear, he said, Mr Duckenfield wanted the match to go 3 ahead. It was live, he said, on TV. He did not want 4 any delays.</p> <p>5 Members of the jury, we know that it was not live on 6 television in this country. It was abroad.</p> <p>7 He said that by 2.15, the Spion Kop looked pretty 8 full. At the Leppings Lane end, the centre pens looked, 9 he said, very full. The pens by the police control box 10 were about a third full. The pen near the north stand 11 was about a sixth full. In previous semi-finals, he 12 said the crowd generally came in early. Most of 13 the ground was full by 2.15 in previous semi-finals.</p> <p>14 He said by 2.45 a lot of people had come into the 15 north stand. The young men near him were boisterous and 16 using bad language, and he formed the impression they'd 17 come from the pub. He could smell alcohol from where he 18 stood. He described them as quite abusive to him and 19 some cameramen nearby, and as "very intoxicated".</p> <p>20 In 1989, he said they would ordinarily have been 21 arrested. He said that "Their behaviour crossed the 22 borderline". He said he had not seen such hostility and 23 abuse from fans before. He said it was frightening.</p> <p>24 He said of his radio that it was working perfectly 25 between 2.45 and 3.10. He clearly heard every message</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 14</p>	<p>1 been pretty obvious to everybody in the police control 2 box that the two central pens were "packed solid".</p> <p>3 At about 2.55, Mr Walpole said he heard PC Buxton 4 asking for the kick-off to be delayed. He said 5 Sergeant Goddard immediately said, "We've no chance. 6 One of the teams is out". Mr Walpole said he saw the 7 Liverpool team were having a kickabout and that the 8 Nottingham Forest team had not come out; neither had the 9 referee.</p> <p>10 The 14:55 message as mentioned in PC Bichard's first 11 log. Mr Walpole said that, although his radio was "very 12 good" in the way it worked, he heard no message to the 13 effect that the gates at the back of the tunnel should 14 be closed. In his statement from April 1989, Mr Walpole 15 recorded:</p> <p>16 "I did not hear any radio message for the entrance 17 to the central pen to be closed off, despite this being 18 packed solid."</p> <p>19 Mr Walpole said that he became aware of the match 20 kicking off. He was facing the fans in the north stand. 21 He became aware of a strike at goal by Peter Beardsley 22 at 15:04, members of the jury. He saw some fans 23 climbing over the fencing at Leppings Lane. Some fans 24 near him in the north stand were being "really 25 aggressive" to a photographer. He saw Mr Greenwood run</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 16</p>

4 (Pages 13 to 16)

1 onto the pitch. He saw that people were being crushed
 2 and suffering injuries at the Leppings Lane end. He
 3 heard Inspector Sewell's message telling control he had
 4 five serials in the gymnasium. A full serial, he said,
 5 appeared in front of him facing the crowd he was facing.
 6 He said he was afraid of a pitch invasion from the north
 7 stand. He said he saw casualties being placed on
 8 advertising hoardings.

9 In his April 1989 statement, he had said it was not
 10 until about 3.15 that the scale of the disaster became
 11 apparent. He agreed that this reflected his impression
 12 of what was going on at the time. Mr Walpole could not
 13 be specific about when he appreciated that there was
 14 a problem, but he thought, he said, that it was around
 15 kick-off time.

16 In his statement to the IPCC, he said it was obvious
 17 to him that it was not a pitch invasion.

18 He said there were no radio messages after 3.15.
 19 There were no senior officers around:
 20 "... it was basically", as he put it, "use your
 21 commonsense and you just did what you could where you
 22 happened to be".

23 Mr Walpole told Operation Resolve that at the time
 24 he thought more emphasis was put on trying to stop the
 25 Liverpool fans getting to the Nottingham Forest fans and

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1 having a punch-up, rather than dealing with what was
 2 happening.

3 Mr Walpole's accounts of these events. He said that
 4 an inspector at Clay Wheels Lane, where he went before
 5 going off duty, the police station there, told him not
 6 to make any notes in his pocketbook. He said it struck
 7 him as unusual. In fact, he made a short note on
 8 Wednesday, 26 April, when he returned from holiday. He
 9 said he would have put in more detail had he not been
 10 told not to make a pocketbook entry. It was a note for
 11 his own information.

12 Mr Walpole's first handwritten account. He said
 13 that was written after he had seen the Wain memo, as we
 14 have called it. He was given no instructions on what to
 15 put in his statement. He said there was no closing of
 16 ranks or pressure. The statement was typed up and
 17 entered on the police HOLMES computer system. At some
 18 point, he had corrected an error. He had originally
 19 written that Mr Duckenfield had stopped the match.

20 The statement, in that form, contained a section at
 21 the end with Mr Walpole's views, and that included that
 22 there seemed to be no organisation or radio message
 23 after 3.15; that the disaster was caused mainly by the
 24 fans; that something should have been done to prevent
 25 overcrowding in the pens.

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1 Mr Metcalf, members of the jury, the solicitor,
 2 advised that that section at the end be removed and
 3 suggested "reviewing" a statement that the officer had
 4 not heard any radio message asking for the central pens
 5 to be closed off although it was packed solid.

6 19 May 1989: Mr Walpole's pocketbook entry. In his
 7 pocketbook on that day, Mr Walpole recorded that
 8 Sergeant Watts "stated the solicitors acting for the
 9 police had retyped my statement and had deleted certain
 10 items, one being the fact I heard PC1863 [PC Buxton]
 11 request game to be delayed". In fact, members of the
 12 jury, we know that Mr Metcalf did not advise removing
 13 the reference to Mr Buxton's request.

14 Mr Walpole said that Sergeant Watts produced
 15 a statement for him to sign. The reference to Mr Buxton
 16 had been deleted; so, too, had some other comments.
 17 Mr Walpole said he refused to sign it. He made a note
 18 in his pocketbook about it. As he put it, "because this
 19 was one of the most important facts of my evidence that
 20 had been removed".

21 Having, as he noted in his pocketbook, at 3.30,
 22 spoken to the Police Federation, he said he told
 23 Sergeant Watts he would not sign a statement "which has
 24 been doctored or changed". He said the document he was
 25 asked to sign was a clean, typed copy. We do not have

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1 a copy of it.

2 That was 19 May.

3 30 May, which was a Tuesday: meeting Chief Inspector
 4 Foster.

5 On Tuesday, 30 May, Mr Walpole said he was asked to
 6 see Chief Inspector Beal. He made an entry in his
 7 pocketbook. Mr Beal told him to see Chief Inspector
 8 Foster at police headquarters about his statement. As
 9 the next entry in his pocketbook records, made at 2.40,
 10 he went to headquarters with two other officers,
 11 PC Smith and PC Groome.

12 Mr Beal was asked about Mr Walpole's evidence that
 13 he had ordered Mr Walpole to go and see Mr Foster at
 14 police headquarters because he would not sign an altered
 15 statement.

16 Mr Walpole did not suggest that Mr Beal put any
 17 pressure on him. Mr Beal said he remembered no dealings
 18 with Mr Walpole of that kind. He would have been
 19 involved as a matter of protocol in these events, as he
 20 was one of Mr Walpole's supervising officers; Chief
 21 Inspector Foster was not.

22 He said, did Mr Beal, that he would not expect to
 23 know why Mr Walpole was being called to headquarters.

24 Mr Walpole, PC Walpole, as he then was, said he met
 25 Chief Inspector Foster at 2.40 at headquarters. On his

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<p>1 way, he gathered PCs Smith and Groome. They were also 2 refusing, he said, to sign their amended statements. He 3 thought that they had mentioned that their statements 4 had been altered. He thought that he was the first to 5 see Mr Foster. He said this, did Mr Walpole: 6 "[He] said [Mr Foster] it was about the Hillsborough 7 disaster statements, and he had got a copy of my 8 original typed statement, and there were marks all over 9 it that he had put on it. He was indicating to me 10 matters that were going to be removed, and he said this 11 was all opinions and criticisms that weren't allowed and 12 that I would be getting a retyped version that would be 13 sent through for signing. Obviously I told him I wasn't 14 happy about this and I thought police officers' opinions 15 and criticisms in the circumstances were very important. 16 But he told me that wasn't going to happen. I also 17 brought up to him the point about PC Buxton asking for 18 the match to be delayed had been taken out, and he 19 agreed that that would be allowed to be kept in it. So, 20 basically, he was ordering me that a retyped statement 21 be sent to me and I would be expected to sign that 22 without further delay." 23 To Operation Resolve, Mr Walpole put it in this way: 24 "He [Chief Inspector Foster] handed to me what was 25 a copy of my original statement which contained several</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 21</p>	<p>1 late with submitting these", said Mr Walpole. 2 Mr Walpole said he read it through and the part relating 3 to Mr Buxton was there. The comments were not. He 4 decided he would be happy to sign it. 5 A curious feature, members of the jury, of 6 Mr Walpole's case is that it appears from the records 7 that West Midlands Police actually received a copy of 8 the original, unamended account which he had written. 9 The Stuart-Smith Scrutiny. As you will recall, 10 these matters were looked into by Lord Justice 11 Stuart-Smith. In his response to the Stuart-Smith 12 Scrutiny, Mr Walpole said: 13 "Since I, like most others, was suffering from 14 post-traumatic stress and depression, I agreed to the 15 deletions to my final statement under the conditions 16 I was placed under." 17 PC Groome. He was a community constable stationed 18 at Hammerton Road. He was part of serial 1 in 1988 and 19 1989. He had considerable experience of working at 20 Hillsborough. He was at the Kop end on 15 April. 21 Having policed 70 or so matches at Hillsborough, 22 Mr Groome said it was known that there were problems 23 with the radios. There had been communications 24 breakdowns before. Anybody planning or controlling the 25 match ought to have taken precautions or made</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 23</p>
<p>1 paragraphs highlighted in pen. He stated that all these 2 items were opinion and were to be removed. I told him 3 that I objected to this and that I believed that 4 a police officer should be able to make a statement of 5 fact and opinion and it should be up to the courts or an 6 inquest to decide if the opinion was important and not 7 for police management to doctor statements. I also 8 stated that the matter of PC Buxton radioing for a delay 9 in the kick-off was clear fact and not an opinion. 10 Chief Inspector Foster said he would allow the mention 11 of PC Buxton requesting a delay to the kick-off, but 12 other than that, there was no way my original statement 13 would be submitted." 14 Mr Walpole said that that was an accurate account 15 that he gave to Operation Resolve. He said he could not 16 remember Mr Foster saying he could not be critical of 17 senior officers. Mr Foster made no direct threats. He 18 said the situation was very intimidating. He was under 19 severe pressure to comply. He had known, he said, of 20 officers hounded out of the police. He was thinking, 21 "I'm going to have to sign this". 22 On Tuesday, 8 June 1989, Sergeant Watts gave 23 Mr Walpole the typed-up copy of the statement to sign, 24 and there is an entry in the notebook to that effect. 25 He said it needed to be signed because "we're getting</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 22</p>	<p>1 arrangements for an effective system of communications 2 because the radios would not work if required. 3 The briefing. Mr Groome agreed there was a history 4 prior to Hillsborough between him and Chief 5 Superintendent Duckenfield. He held Mr Duckenfield in 6 pretty low regard. At first he said that at the 7 briefing Mr Duckenfield had stated that "under no 8 circumstances would the kick-off be delayed, and either 9 he or Mr Marshall said nobody was to be allowed onto the 10 track area, the perimeter track, for any reason". He 11 said he did not interpret that as being different from 12 what was said in the match order. He said 13 Mr Duckenfield's briefing "gave the impression that it 14 was very unlikely that permission would be given for 15 anybody to be allowed onto the track". However, in his 16 original statement in 1989, he had said: 17 "I can specifically remember Chief Superintendent 18 Duckenfield stating during the briefing that at this 19 stage there is no provision for the kick-off to be put 20 back". He agreed that meant they were not then planning 21 to delay the kick-off. There was a contingency that 22 they might. 23 Mr Groome said he was positioned at a gate to the 24 right of the goal, as one looks at the Kop. At one 25 stage, on Inspector Darling's orders, he moved some</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 24</p>

<p>1 Liverpool fans who were in the Kop to the sterile 2 section at the end of the terrace that was set aside for 3 them. 4 As he was returning, he said he noticed officers 5 entering the ground from Penistone Road via gate O. The 6 officers entered the pitch, he said, at the north-east 7 corner and ran down towards the Leppings Lane end. He 8 saw, he said, some Liverpool fans trying to come over 9 the top of the fencing. He assumed it was a pitch 10 invasion. He returned to his position on the perimeter 11 track. His radio, he said, was basically non-existent. 12 The cordon across the pitch. He said in his 13 statement that at some stage 40 to 50 Liverpool fans 14 started to run down from about the halfway line towards 15 the Nottingham fans who had been baiting them. The 16 Nottingham fans did not know what was happening. In his 17 view, there should have been a tannoy message explaining 18 the situation. In his statement, which he said was 19 right, he stated the 40 to 50 Liverpool fans were 20 "obviously upset, most were drunk and were screaming and 21 shouting angrily at the Forest fans". He said he spoke 22 to two or three and could smell the alcohol on them. He 23 said their eyes were glazed. He agreed that glazed eyes 24 might be as a result of a number of factors other than 25 alcohol, such as distress. He said that could not</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 25</p>	<p>1 Mr Groome -- as "scuttlebutt". He heard a rumour that 2 there was a meeting at which Mr Duckenfield, 3 Chief Superintendent Duckenfield, Mr Creaser, 4 Mr Anderson and Mr Murray, but not Mr Marshall, were 5 present. The rumour, the scuttlebutt, was that most 6 were Freemasons. Members of the jury, there was not 7 a shred of evidence that such a meeting ever took place 8 or that all those named were Freemasons. Those few 9 witnesses asked about it said there was no such meeting. 10 I think I mentioned this at the time that he gave this 11 evidence: in the circumstances, you will obviously put 12 this piece of gossip and hearsay to one side. It cannot 13 help in your determination. I think that was 14 a direction I gave at the time. 15 Mr Groome in his statement spoke of it not being 16 possible to pass 30,000 or 40,000 people through the 17 turnstiles at the Leppings Lane end in an hour. He 18 agreed that was too great a figure. 24,000 was the 19 correct figure. He agreed that might be an example of 20 him being in a state of some emotional difficulty at the 21 time he made the statement. 22 He made some observations, criticisms, of different 23 officers, and you will have to decide how balanced, in 24 fact, Mr Groome's views were. He, himself, had never 25 been in the police control box in a capacity match. He</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 27</p>
<p>1 account for the smell of alcohol. It seemed to him, he 2 said, that there would be a public order situation. He 3 and several other officers went forward and stopped the 4 Liverpool fans running down. By then, there were people 5 running with hoardings with injured people on them. He 6 realised it was not a public order situation. 7 He said that he was ordered to the area of the south 8 stand by Chief Inspector Beal where there had been some 9 reports of fights between Liverpool and Nottingham fans. 10 He said Nottingham fans were still abusive. The 11 Liverpool fans were shouting and screaming back. He 12 said he could smell "intoxicants" on them. It was 13 possible they were primarily reacting to distress at 14 what was going on around them. He did not, in the end, 15 have any problems to deal with there. 16 He said the discussion among police officers was 17 that one of the gates at Leppings Lane end had been 18 forced and the Liverpool fans had burst in. He said he 19 heard this as he made his way from the ground to the 20 Niagara Sports Club. He arrived at the Niagara at about 21 quarter past 6. He did not know where that information 22 had come from. 23 The alleged meeting in the Portacabins in the car 24 park at Hammerton Road. Mr Groome said he heard 25 a rumour. He described it -- this may remind you of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 26</p>	<p>1 said of Sergeant Goddard that he would not have done any 2 practical police work, other than working the occasional 3 match. He told Operation Resolve that Mr Goddard was 4 mostly a good choice, although his reactions were 5 slowing down. 6 Of PC Ryan, he said he was not used to reacting 7 quickly in situations. He said PC Bichard was a good 8 practical officer. He said to Operation Resolve that 9 the supervisory officers had not learnt from previous 10 experience. He said there was bad behaviour by 11 Nottingham and Liverpool supporters in 1988. The 12 policing, he said, had become complacent. He agreed 13 that in charge over those years would have been Chief 14 Superintendent Mole. He finally agreed there was an 15 inconsistency between the praise he expressed for 16 Mr Mole and the criticism of complacency. He said 17 insufficient notice had been taken of football 18 intelligence and current trends. He had not read 19 Detective Sergeant Charlesworth's intelligence report to 20 Mr Duckenfield of 14 April. He did not know what 21 intelligence had been given to the officer in overall 22 command. He did not accept he was prepared to speculate 23 on things he knew nothing about. 24 As I say, you will have to decide how balanced, 25 overall, Mr Groome's views were.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 28</p>

<p>1 On Sunday, 16 April, he said he went to the area 2 office, police office. Someone told him, "they want 3 recollections of what happened. Don't put it on a CJA 4 [Criminal Justice Act] ... section 9 statement. Don't 5 sign it. Just ... your own thoughts, recollections on 6 this plain paper." 7 He said he would have put various details in his 8 pocketbook. He no longer had it. He said he had heard 9 from the morning groups at the police station that 10 Mr Duckenfield had said they had to stick together, be 11 careful about what they were saying; in other words, 12 what he said he'd heard was hearsay. He had no direct 13 contact with Mr Duckenfield. He said he did not want to 14 hear Mr Duckenfield give a pep talk. He had spoken of 15 Mr Duckenfield in terms of being a "fucking idiot". 16 He said of his first handwritten account that 17 somebody in the area office told him not to date it. 18 His first statement bears the date of 4 May 1989. On 19 15 May 1989, Mr Metcalf suggested amendments to the 20 statement. He advised that a reference to "paralysis" 21 in the control room was comment, as were certain 22 references to the supervisory officers. He pointed out 23 that a series of numbered paragraphs at the end giving 24 Mr Groome's views were helpful to the police, but "not 25 appropriate for inclusion in this statement of fact".</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 29</p>	<p>1 said it seemed to him they were terrified of junior 2 officers criticising senior officers and undermining the 3 command structure. He said Mr Foster was crossing 4 through things and ringing things: 5 "He basically inferred that if I didn't agree to 6 these amendments, the statement ... wouldn't be 7 presented to the Taylor Inquiry and it wouldn't be part 8 of the West Midlands Inquiry and it would be spirited 9 away ..." 10 The meeting ended, he said, with an agreement that 11 the amended version would be sent to Mr Groome. He 12 thought, said Mr Groome, that one of the sergeants 13 brought it to him. He signed it: 14 "I thought ... if I don't then ... I am not going to 15 have a chance to say what I wanted to say." 16 He said he did not thereafter raise the matter. 17 Members of the jury, the retyped, amended, signed 18 account was sent to the West Midlands Police for the 19 Taylor Inquiry. It still bore the date 4 May 1989. 20 Mr Groome had signed each page. The sentence: 21 "The control room seemed to have been hit by some 22 sort of paralysis" was deleted. Part of the statement 23 originally had read: 24 "It was noticeable that the only supervisory 25 officers above the rank of inspector on the pitch were</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 31</p>
<p>1 In fact, those paragraphs consisted mainly of criticism 2 of the police command. 3 Mr Groome's evidence about the statements. He said 4 his original account was submitted up the chain of 5 command. He had three or four visits, he said, from 6 a mixture of three sergeants. They told him that "they 7 want you to change this, they want you to change that". 8 He told them, he said, he was not changing anything. 9 They showed him some print-outs, not the original 10 statements. He thought one of them, he said, may have 11 had suggested amendments on it. He said he inferred 12 this was happening because the solicitors were not happy 13 with what he originally said. 14 Mr Groome said that on 30 May 1989 he received 15 a telephone call from Inspector Fidler or 16 Inspector Sewell. It ended with him, PC Walpole and 17 PC Smith going by car to headquarters and meeting Chief 18 Inspector Foster. He, Mr Foster, that is, had a copy, 19 said Mr Groome, of Mr Groome's statement. Mr Groome 20 said: 21 "He started to go through the statement saying, 'You 22 can't say that'. 'Why not?' 'Well, it's criticising 23 senior officers. You can't criticise the command 24 structure ...'" 25 Mr Groome said that they disagreed for an hour. He</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 30</p>	<p>1 Chief Inspectors Beal and Sumner and Superintendent 2 Greenwood. Certain supervisory officers were 3 conspicuous by their absence. It was utter chaos." 4 That was changed to: 5 "On the pitch were Chief Inspectors Beal and 6 Sumner ..." 7 Whereas Mr Metcalf had suggested deleting all the 8 numbered paragraphs at the end, in fact two of those 9 were kept in amended form. One referred to the 10 demeanour of the fans; the other to the practice of 11 Mr Mole walking the perimeter track. The passages most 12 critical of South Yorkshire Police had been removed. 13 Mr Groome agreed with Mr Weatherby that what went to 14 the Taylor Inquiry following the amendments was frankly 15 misleading. 16 Members of the jury, I am going to take rather 17 earlier a short break, because there is one note I just 18 want to confirm before completing this part of 19 the summing-up and turning to the police operations 20 room, which is the next topic I am going to deal with. 21 So, members of the jury, I will take the break now, 22 if I may. We will say 11.15 am. I hope it will be all 23 right to go up to the lunchbreak, possibly a fraction 24 earlier, the lunchbreak, and deal with it in that way. 25 Thank you very much.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 32</p>

<p>1 (11.04 am)</p> <p>2 (A short break)</p> <p>3 (11.17 am)</p> <p>4 THE CORONER: Members of the jury, I am now going to turn to</p> <p>5 the police operations room at Snig Hill and the response</p> <p>6 there to the unfolding disaster. The person in charge</p> <p>7 was Chief Inspector Edmundson. He was in charge as</p> <p>8 chief inspector. He had previously been an inspector</p> <p>9 there. In both roles, he was a member of the Operations</p> <p>10 Department, which was headed by Assistant Chief</p> <p>11 Constable Jackson.</p> <p>12 The operations room was a forcewide control centre.</p> <p>13 It directed operational resources, which were centrally</p> <p>14 controlled by the force. It dealt with 999 calls. It</p> <p>15 directed traffic mobiles. It had contact with local</p> <p>16 subdivisional control rooms. Each subdivision had its</p> <p>17 own control room. F1 Division, therefore, had a control</p> <p>18 room at Hammerton Road.</p> <p>19 At Hillsborough, there was, of course, the localised</p> <p>20 police control box. In short, therefore, there were</p> <p>21 three different control centres: the forcewide one; the</p> <p>22 subdivisional one; and the local match one.</p> <p>23 The operations room was large. It was set out in</p> <p>24 tiers. As well as a chief inspector and a sergeant,</p> <p>25 there were eight constables and some civilian staff.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 33</p>	<p>1 threatening death or injury to numbers of people in</p> <p>2 excess of those that can be dealt with by the public</p> <p>3 services operating under normal conditions and which</p> <p>4 require special mobilisation and organisation of those</p> <p>5 services."</p> <p>6 The next part is headed "Objectives of the major</p> <p>7 incident plan":</p> <p>8 "It is impossible to cater for every contingency</p> <p>9 which might arise in a major incident situation. The</p> <p>10 major incident plan, therefore, contains a basic format</p> <p>11 on which all major incidents should be based.</p> <p>12 "Whilst setting out basic principles and</p> <p>13 responsibilities to be adhered to, it also allows for</p> <p>14 flexibility and initiative in the prevailing</p> <p>15 circumstances."</p> <p>16 Members of the jury, if you look at the following</p> <p>17 page, section 2, it begins with a list. It is headed</p> <p>18 "Basic principles of major incident operations":</p> <p>19 "The initial objectives of all services involved in</p> <p>20 a major incident are:</p> <p>21 "(a) to ensure that those who can assist, get to the</p> <p>22 scene as soon as possible;</p> <p>23 "(b) to safeguard all persons and property from</p> <p>24 further danger;</p> <p>25 "(c) to release casualties from the wreckage as soon</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 35</p>
<p>1 They would be manning telephone lines and radio</p> <p>2 equipment. There were direct lines to the fire service</p> <p>3 and the ambulance service.</p> <p>4 Next to the operations room was the major incident</p> <p>5 room. That had desks and communications equipment. It</p> <p>6 was similar to the main operations room, although much</p> <p>7 smaller. It was normally staffed. It would serve as</p> <p>8 a Casualty Bureau for the force and take all incoming</p> <p>9 calls and try to establish the identity of people</p> <p>10 involved. The Casualty Bureau was effectively</p> <p>11 a clearing house for dealing with information about</p> <p>12 people who had been injured or killed.</p> <p>13 Members of the jury, Mr Edmundson was taken through</p> <p>14 and commented upon different parts of the major incident</p> <p>15 manual of the South Yorkshire Police. I think it would</p> <p>16 be helpful for us just to look at it together. It is in</p> <p>17 your black jury file. It is tab R. Do you all have</p> <p>18 that, members of the jury? It is the black file,</p> <p>19 please, at tab R, and the page that I am going first to</p> <p>20 is internal page 4. It is also the SYP reference</p> <p>21 number, 4, as well. It is the part that is headed</p> <p>22 "Major incident", and it defines a major incident in</p> <p>23 these terms:</p> <p>24 "A major incident is defined as a serious disruption</p> <p>25 of life, arising with little or no warning, causing or</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 34</p>	<p>1 as possible."</p> <p>2 This, members of the jury, is page 5, headed</p> <p>3 section 2. It is the opposite page, in other words, to</p> <p>4 the one with the definition and the objectives that</p> <p>5 I previously referred to:</p> <p>6 "(c) to release casualties from the wreckage [as it</p> <p>7 describes it] ...</p> <p>8 "(d) to quickly and accurately assess and treat</p> <p>9 injuries;</p> <p>10 "(e) to transport casualties to hospitals with the</p> <p>11 minimum of delay;</p> <p>12 "(f) to provide prompt and skilled treatment on</p> <p>13 arrival at hospital;</p> <p>14 "(g) to inform the relatives of casualties of their</p> <p>15 condition and whereabouts;</p> <p>16 "(h) to re-establish normal conditions as soon as</p> <p>17 possible."</p> <p>18 It says:</p> <p>19 "These objectives cannot be met by any one service.</p> <p>20 A major incident will invariably require the full</p> <p>21 involvement of all three primary emergency services --</p> <p>22 ie, police, fire and ambulance. These services will be</p> <p>23 supported by the local authority and a number of other</p> <p>24 agencies."</p> <p>25 It goes on to say:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 36</p>

<p>1 "To deal effectively with a major incident, there 2 must be a common policy and a complete understanding 3 between all three services. This will necessitate: 4 "(i) the establishment of lines of control and 5 communication at the earliest possible stage; 6 "(ii) the establishment of liaison between all 7 services for effective coordination; 8 "(iii) the provision of facilities to enable each 9 service to operate to maximum efficiency; 10 "(iv) the coordination of requests for and 11 allocation of resources in order of priority." 12 It then says: 13 "The overall control and coordination of the effort 14 of all the services involved in dealing with a major 15 incident is a POLICE responsibility." 16 Members of the jury, if you turn on, please, to 17 section 4, which is page 7, it deals with the alert, and 18 it says this: 19 "Initial notification that a large-scale emergency 20 may have occurred within the force area may come to the 21 police by various means. Whether it comes from Air 22 Traffic Control, British Rail, Fire Control, from 23 a patrolling officer, a member of the public or any 24 other source, it is possible that the available 25 information may not immediately indicate the exact Page 37</p>	<p>1 room, that is. I don't think it is necessary to read 2 the whole of it. It says: 3 "The following list ..." 4 It is called checklist 1. It also has checklist 2. 5 Checklist 1: 6 "The following list of police personnel should be 7 notified in the event of a major incident." 8 It is then said not to be in order of priority, 9 necessarily, and it sets out the various senior, running 10 to more junior, officers, and also other organisations 11 which should be informed. It sets out in checklist 2 12 other services and organisations which may be of 13 assistance. 14 Mr Edmundson agreed that the operations room does 15 not take over the policing on the ground. It has the 16 role of alerting and coordinating other emergency 17 services. 18 Members of the jury, if you turn, please, to 19 section 4, which involves going back again -- I beg your 20 pardon, page 8, if you would, please, section 5. It 21 deals with the role of the first officer at the scene. 22 It says: 23 "The first police officer at the scene will be faced 24 with enormous demands and his initial reaction may well 25 be to render assistance to survivors. This temptation Page 39</p>
<p>1 extent of the incident. 2 "It is imperative that no delay should arise while 3 confirmation or further information is being sought, but 4 action must be taken immediately on whatever information 5 is available. Circumstances will soon indicate if 6 a large-scale response is not required. 7 "If notification is received, the information must 8 be passed immediately to the Force Operations room, who 9 will alert the other emergency services that a major 10 incident may have occurred and that the police are 11 implementing the 'major incident' plan. 12 "The recognised codeword between the emergency 13 services is: 14 "'Catastrophe'. 15 Mr Edmundson said it was his understanding that the 16 word "Catastrophe" needed to be used at an early stage 17 after identification of a major incident in 18 communications with other emergency services. It was 19 important because it was a word recognised by all three 20 services as identifying a genuine major incident. It 21 would make all other emergency services aware that it 22 was a major incident under their plans and trigger the 23 procedures associated. 24 Section 7, members of the jury, deals with the 25 operations room's responsibilities, the Force Operations Page 38</p>	<p>1 must be resisted if coordinated rescue plans are to be 2 brought into operation." 3 Item number 4, to which I was going to draw your 4 attention, says: 5 "Inform Force Operations room -- by the best means 6 available, giving the following information ..." 7 Then the exact location; the type of incident; 8 risks; casualties; emergency services; and roads. At 9 the end: 10 "Liaise with first supervisory officer at the 11 scene." 12 Mr Edmundson agreed that the items set out in 13 paragraph 4 were not given to him in the police 14 operations room. 15 If you turn, please, members of the jury, to 16 page 11, section 7, it sets out the duties of 17 the inspector, Force Operations room. I am not going to 18 read the whole of it, members of the jury. It says, 19 among other things: 20 "From the information obtained ..." 21 I'm looking at the paragraph in the middle of 22 the page: 23 "From the information obtained, the officer in 24 charge ..." 25 You might want to write in there "Chief Inspector Page 40</p>

<p>1 Edmundson":</p> <p>2 "... the officer in charge of Force Operations room</p> <p>3 must decide whether to implement the major incident</p> <p>4 plan. The only advice that can be offered in making the</p> <p>5 decision is to consider the major incident definition</p> <p>6 [which we looked at] in the light of the information</p> <p>7 gained from the first officer at the scene. Having</p> <p>8 decided to implement the plan, the following action</p> <p>9 should be taken:</p> <p>10 "3. Alert emergency services -- alert fire and</p> <p>11 ambulance services using the codeword 'Catastrophe'."</p> <p>12 Then it refers to commencing an incident log and</p> <p>13 informing subdivision, and in paragraph 6:</p> <p>14 "Deploy personnel -- deploy available traffic</p> <p>15 vehicles to junctions and routes in the vicinity."</p> <p>16 Under "Incident update" it says:</p> <p>17 "Using the following guidelines:</p> <p>18 "(a) confirm location of incident and ascertain</p> <p>19 location of incident post", and also it refers to</p> <p>20 casualties and fatalities.</p> <p>21 It says, if you turn over the page, please, in</p> <p>22 paragraph 8, "Update emergency services":</p> <p>23 "Pass on all confirmed information to the fire and</p> <p>24 ambulance services. Request that a senior officer from</p> <p>25 each of those services attends the scene to liaise with</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 41</p>	<p>1 whom he delegated that function.</p> <p>2 He was asked about the South Yorkshire Emergency</p> <p>3 Services Liaison Committee, and it had, as you may</p> <p>4 recall -- I don't think we need to go into the detail of</p> <p>5 it -- two meetings prior to the disaster. One was on</p> <p>6 12 January 1989 at the fire service headquarters, and</p> <p>7 Mr Edmundson is recorded as going through the debrief</p> <p>8 notes of a mock major incident which had taken place in</p> <p>9 the previous October and outlining the main points which</p> <p>10 involved the two other services, and the topics raised,</p> <p>11 including parking, problems with parking leading to</p> <p>12 congestion; the need to establish the role of a liaison</p> <p>13 officer to ensure liaison between the services;</p> <p>14 communications between the control rooms; identifying</p> <p>15 garments for incident commanders; and the movement of</p> <p>16 dead bodies.</p> <p>17 As to planning for the match on 15 April,</p> <p>18 Mr Edmundson said the general purpose of the operations</p> <p>19 room would be to make sure that fans from each of</p> <p>20 the clubs arrived at the ground safely and as quickly as</p> <p>21 possible.</p> <p>22 Watches would be kept on the motorways and the</p> <p>23 routes people were taking to make sure there was no</p> <p>24 problem. If there was, match control would be told so</p> <p>25 that they could think about postponing the kick-off. As</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 43</p>
<p>1 the police site commander."</p> <p>2 Under "Communications", it says:</p> <p>3 "Contact the communications officer in respect of</p> <p>4 the mobile police station", to which reference is made</p> <p>5 in the preceding paragraph. At the end of that list, at</p> <p>6 number 14, it says:</p> <p>7 "Liaison with site commander. Maintain liaison with</p> <p>8 the site commander throughout the incident."</p> <p>9 Mr Edmundson agreed that if he was in the operations</p> <p>10 room it was for him to decide whether to implement the</p> <p>11 major incident plan. The duties set out in the manual</p> <p>12 would then have to be carried out. Such things as</p> <p>13 commencing a computerised log; informing subdivisional</p> <p>14 control in the relevant areas; deploying personnel,</p> <p>15 including traffic officers; carrying out an incident</p> <p>16 update; updating the other emergency services; ensuring</p> <p>17 the force major incident box was taken to the site --</p> <p>18 that's number 9, which I didn't specifically read out in</p> <p>19 that list that we were just looking at, members of the</p> <p>20 jury; assisting with communications; calling out senior</p> <p>21 officers; establishing a Casualty Bureau; liaison with</p> <p>22 hospitals; maintaining liaison with the police site</p> <p>23 commander.</p> <p>24 He said that the police site commander would be the</p> <p>25 match commander in the police control box or anyone to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 42</p>	<p>1 far as he was aware, there were no problems with traffic</p> <p>2 that day, although some problems outside the immediate</p> <p>3 Sheffield area were identified in a West Midlands Police</p> <p>4 report after the disaster.</p> <p>5 Mr Edmundson knew that SYMAS staff and vehicles</p> <p>6 would be at the ground, he said. He did not know where.</p> <p>7 He did not know how many ambulances there would be.</p> <p>8 He said that in the operations room, the police</p> <p>9 operations room, they communicated mainly by the VHF</p> <p>10 network, which enabled them to contact mobile vehicles</p> <p>11 and the police control box. This was the system</p> <p>12 recorded on the Racal tapes. They also had the facility</p> <p>13 to hear traffic on the UHF network which was used by the</p> <p>14 police officers with personal radios at the ground.</p> <p>15 They could broadcast messages on the UHF network as</p> <p>16 well. The radio, he said, was adequate.</p> <p>17 Members of the jury, the call sign "XS" on the</p> <p>18 transcripts which we shall shortly look at is</p> <p>19 a reference to the Force Operations room call sign.</p> <p>20 The major incident room also had telephone lines.</p> <p>21 The nearest television was in the bar area on the</p> <p>22 top floor. No use was made of it on the day.</p> <p>23 The major incident room, by the Force Operations</p> <p>24 room, was running specifically for the semi-final.</p> <p>25 Mr Edmundson said he was there with two police</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 44</p>

11 (Pages 41 to 44)

<p>1 constables. They had access to all the communications 2 I have described. They were listening to the match and 3 traffic cars. That left an inspector and sergeant in 4 charge of the operations room. They were dealing with 5 ordinary police business in South Yorkshire. 6 Members of the jury, I am now going to turn, please, 7 to the Racial communications, and we haven't, I think, in 8 any detail -- we have referred to them very briefly, but 9 not closely. Green file, please, tab 8. This, of 10 course, is a much more complete summary than that which 11 you originally -- still do, actually, have in your red 12 file. 13 Members of the jury, I am obviously for the moment 14 concentrating on topics which involve the police 15 operations room. We shall be returning to this, for 16 example, when dealing with various pieces of SYMAS 17 evidence. 18 If you look, please, at the second entry, 14:41:18 19 to 14:41:41, SYP Hillsborough to SYP headquarters. This 20 is Hillsborough: 21 "We're having extreme difficulty with our radio at 22 this location, in fact our radio has gone down, we've 23 got a radio down over here ..." 24 I think I referred to that previously: 25 "SYP headquarters: Roger, XS. Ground control have Page 45</p>	<p>1 Racial chronology. Members of the jury, page 2, please, 2 first entry, top of the page, "14:43:42, SYP 3 Hillsborough to SYP headquarters, one to the other: 4 "Is there a traffic vehicle available ..." 5 I have already touched upon this in my summary: 6 "Is there a traffic vehicle available with a tannoy 7 system on that could attend Leppings Lane to assist, we 8 have a large crowd at that location and they are causing 9 crushing at the gates. 10 "Stand by XS to any traffic car available ..." 11 So this is headquarters giving its reference and 12 saying to every traffic car: 13 "Stand by ... to any traffic car available for 14 Leppings Lane with a tannoy PA equipment at 15 Leppings Lane ..." 16 Mr Edmundson said that he heard 17 Superintendent Marshall calling for a vehicle with a PA 18 system. He said he also heard calls for more horses and 19 some reinforcements. 20 As to Mr Marshall's requests to open the gates, 21 Mr Edmundson said he heard Mr Marshall plead for the 22 gate or gates to be opened. He said Mr Marshall spoke 23 of a problem outside the turnstiles at Leppings Lane 24 end; that people were in danger of being crushed; that 25 there was some danger of a wall going in. In response Page 47</p>
<p>1 you got communications officers with you? 2 "Yes, roger. We've got communications officer 3 working on it [obviously a reference to 4 Mr Sanderson] ... he'll advise us when it's clear. 5 "... we are monitoring your UHF communications from 6 this office", says the police operations room. 7 Mr Edmundson, in his original statement, put it in 8 this way: 9 "All the time we had been monitoring Hillsborough 10 ground control on channel 25 via the repeater set in the 11 incident room. I recognised Sergeant Goddard as the 12 main operator ... up to 2.15 pm, the reception was good 13 and there were no unusual problems. Then for the next 14 20 to 25 minutes, the radio was very poor, it broke up 15 and there was a loud whistle ... in fact, I remember 16 them saying they were having problems ..." 17 We have just seen it: 18 "... and we asked if they needed communications 19 people to help. Ground control said they were present 20 and trying to fix it. After that time it was much 21 improved, back to the good reception he had heard 22 earlier that day. That would be about 2.40 pm and after 23 that the reception was clear." 24 So that was Mr Edmundson in his original statement. 25 Problems in Leppings Lane, as referred to on the Page 46</p>	<p>1 to Mr Marshall's request to open the gate or gates, he 2 thought he heard Mr Murray say that there was a need to 3 check tickets; you could not just open the gates and let 4 people in. He said he heard Mr Marshall's request 5 repeated. As he thought, Sergeant Goddard said, "Yes, 6 open the gate", or words to that effect; also, "We can't 7 have people killed", or something to that effect. 8 He did not hear, he said, any message at 2.55, 9 14:55, as recorded in the Bichard first log to the 10 effect, "from the officers at the rear of Leppings Lane, 11 shut the gates at the back of the tunnel". 12 Mr Edmundson said he heard a request made to the 13 control box for the kick-off to be delayed, and as he 14 recalled it, match control saying they could not delay 15 the kick-off because one of the teams was out on the 16 pitch. You may think that is a reference to 17 Sergeant Goddard's response. He could not remember 18 whether this was before or after the messages about the 19 opening of the exit gates. 20 Members of the jury, if we turn over, please, to the 21 next page, the top of page 3, this is PC Waugh in the 22 police operations room calling Hillsborough SYP, 23 obviously PC Ryan in the police control box at the 24 ground: 25 "Yes, it's ops. Do you want any ambulances? We're Page 48</p>

<p>1 trying to monitor you but you know it's ..."</p> <p>2 Then Mr Ryan says:</p> <p>3 "Yes, it's chaos at the moment, we've got no reports</p> <p>4 of injuries, but we, if you can monitor the situation,</p> <p>5 if you can just keep standing by."</p> <p>6 Mr Edmundson said that communications on the radio</p> <p>7 made him and the other two with him think somebody had</p> <p>8 been injured. That is why he asked if ambulances were</p> <p>9 needed.</p> <p>10 Operation Support. The last entry -- we looked at</p> <p>11 this previously -- on this page. The time, 15:05:40 to</p> <p>12 15:05:46:</p> <p>13 " PC Bichard: I'd like to call Operation Support,</p> <p>14 please, Operation Support to Hillsborough.</p> <p>15 "SYP Hillsborough: Roger, Operation Support to</p> <p>16 Hillsborough."</p> <p>17 Mr Edmundson said Operation Support was</p> <p>18 a contingency plan to deal with incidents of spontaneous</p> <p>19 disorder. The Force Operations room had to implement</p> <p>20 it. Calling Operation Support, said Mr Edmundson, would</p> <p>21 tell the officers being called out that they were</p> <p>22 dealing with a public order problem.</p> <p>23 He said the consensus of opinion within the</p> <p>24 operations room at about that time was that it was</p> <p>25 a public order incident outside the turnstiles.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 49</p>	<p>1 attend.</p> <p>2 "We've got a -- yeah, we've got that facility", said</p> <p>3 Mr Clarke:</p> <p>4 "You have got that facility. We'll get back to you</p> <p>5 should we require them.</p> <p>6 "Superintendent Clarke: Yes.</p> <p>7 "PC Rook: It's just sort of to prewarn and to</p> <p>8 preadvise you at the moment.</p> <p>9 "Superintendent Clarke: Okay. So you don't</p> <p>10 definitely need us now?</p> <p>11 "PC Rook: Not at the moment. Not at the moment ...</p> <p>12 unless you want to", and then Mr Rook says, "Sir?</p> <p>13 Sir?", and he's obviously talking to somebody else, and</p> <p>14 in the background, and Mr Edmundson thought it was him:</p> <p>15 "Background shout: Fleet of ambulances, fleet of</p> <p>16 ambulances."</p> <p>17 Then there is a request to go out about a fleet of</p> <p>18 ambulances, and we will return to it. If you look at</p> <p>19 the next entry, members of the jury, 15:07:15 to</p> <p>20 15:07:30, it is SYP Hillsborough, Mr Bichard, to</p> <p>21 headquarters, and it is Mr Bichard, you may think,</p> <p>22 talking to somebody else in the Force Operations room:</p> <p>23 "Hillsborough ground control, Hillsborough ground</p> <p>24 control, urgent message, urgent message, fleet of</p> <p>25 ambulances required at Hillsborough, fleet of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 51</p>
<p>1 Members of the jury, page 4, please, and the last</p> <p>2 entry. Forgive me, I am just going to draw your</p> <p>3 attention to the preceding entry before I go to that</p> <p>4 last entry. 15:06:01 to 15:06:15:</p> <p>5 "SYP HQ: XS to all mobiles ... Operation Support.</p> <p>6 Repeat, Operation Support, Hillsborough football ground.</p> <p>7 "A number of mobiles reply to this call."</p> <p>8 So out goes the call to all the police vehicles.</p> <p>9 Then, 15:06:40 to 15:08:10, PC Rook at the</p> <p>10 Force Operations room to SYMAS headquarters, to</p> <p>11 Superintendent Clarke, as we know it was:</p> <p>12 "Yes, good afternoon. It's PC Rook, South Yorkshire</p> <p>13 Police operations room."</p> <p>14 Mr Clarke says, "Hello":</p> <p>15 "There's been an incident at the Leppings Lane end</p> <p>16 at the Hillsborough football ground, where we may -- we</p> <p>17 may need a few ambulances. It's just an advisory at</p> <p>18 this stage. There's been pushing and shoving and there</p> <p>19 might have been quite a few injuries.</p> <p>20 "At Leppings Lane end of the football ground?", asks</p> <p>21 Mr Clarke in the SYMAS control room:</p> <p>22 "PC Rook: Leppings Lane end at Hillsborough. All</p> <p>23 we're doing at the moment is advising you --</p> <p>24 "Superintendent Clarke: Okay.</p> <p>25 "PC Rook: -- that we may need a few ambulances to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 50</p>	<p>1 ambulances, please, over.</p> <p>2 "Operator: How many are we talking about?"</p> <p>3 Then it has "(inaudible)". Members of the jury,</p> <p>4 that has since been decoded, what is described as</p> <p>5 "(inaudible)", and I will let you have a typed copy of</p> <p>6 this, but in fact the words are:</p> <p>7 "Direct what is available at present and we'll come</p> <p>8 back to you shortly", and then the operator says,</p> <p>9 "Roger". Then it says:</p> <p>10 "Ambulances requested to Leppings Lane."</p> <p>11 Then if we go back to the entry we were just looking</p> <p>12 at, there is then that background shout, "Fleet of</p> <p>13 ambulances, fleet of ambulances". So you may think the</p> <p>14 call comes in to someone else in the operations room</p> <p>15 wanting a fleet of ambulances, and while the</p> <p>16 conversation was taking place between Mr Rook, PC Rook,</p> <p>17 and Superintendent Clarke at SYMAS, that is picked up,</p> <p>18 and in the background Mr Edmundson, as he thought it was</p> <p>19 him, "Fleet of ambulances, fleet of ambulances", and so</p> <p>20 then we move on to:</p> <p>21 "We are requesting a fleet of ambulances.</p> <p>22 "A fleet of ambulances?</p> <p>23 "All ambulances that are available to Hillsborough,</p> <p>24 please.</p> <p>25 "A fleet of ambulances?"</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 52</p>

13 (Pages 49 to 52)

<p>1 "All ambulances that are available that you have got 2 to send [or 'that you've got, they said'] to 3 Hillsborough, please. 4 "All ambulances that are available. So you've -- so 5 you've got quite a few injured then? 6 "A lot of them. Apparently one of the gates -- 7 there's been pushing -- pushing and shoving, 8 I understand, and one of the gates has -- they've 9 collapsed the gates and there's -- 10 "Okay, well, we'll instigate an initial response and 11 we'll assess it from there, okay?" 12 Then Mr Rook says: 13 "All -- all ambulances you've got available, 14 understand? 15 "Superintendent Clarke: Well, we can't do that. 16 I'll send you our initial response and we'll assess -- 17 we've got officers at the scene." 18 Members of the jury, Mr Edmundson agreed that no-one 19 appeared to ask Mr Bichard, PC Bichard, what was going 20 on. He could not say why. Mr Edmundson said he 21 expected police officers at the scene to tell him what 22 was happening or what they required. As I say, he 23 thought he was the one who shouted "fleet of ambulances, 24 fleet of ambulances". 25 As to the reference regarding the forcing of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 53</p>	<p>1 Hillsborough and the number of police officers at 2 Hillsborough. He also agreed with her that the police 3 had a better view of events. They were more familiar 4 with the ground. The police had the leading command and 5 control role, as envisaged by the major incident manual, 6 as we have just seen, members of the jury. 7 At this time, he said he still thought it was 8 a public order incident. He thought that a senior 9 officer at the ground would have told him if it was 10 a major incident. He did not, himself, check whether it 11 was. He did think it was probably part of his job to do 12 so. He agreed, looking at it now, the definition of 13 a major incident, even if caused by a public order 14 problem, was satisfied. 15 He said he never thought to use the word 16 "Catastrophe", and did not use it at any stage. Unlike 17 other types of major incident, there were many, many 18 officers, including very senior officers, at the scene; 19 also, senior ambulance officers and ambulances. He 20 never thought, he said, to use the word "Catastrophe" 21 because it was a genuine major incident. They were 22 already doing things in the operations room which would 23 be triggered by the use of the word "Catastrophe". The 24 only emergency service that was not notified at the time 25 was the fire service. He did not know whether using the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 55</p>
<p>1 the gate, which we have just looked at, he agreed with 2 PC Rook's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry and more 3 recently that that account came from general 4 conversation in the operations room. Nothing was 5 received from the police control box saying that the 6 gates had been forced. 7 He said that if he'd heard Superintendent Clarke of 8 SYMAS respond as recorded, he would have grabbed the 9 phone and spoken to him, himself. He would have 10 confirmed there were injuries at the scene. He needed 11 to send as many ambulances as possible. He should also 12 be in touch with his men on the ground. He thought he 13 recalled being told that SYMAS would not send a fleet of 14 ambulances. 15 He said to Ms Richards that he thought there would 16 have been a better response from the ambulance service 17 to PC Rook, who was a very experienced control room 18 operator. The ambulance service would be well aware of 19 him. He thought they should have sent a fleet of 20 ambulances in response to Mr Rook's request. He agreed 21 he did not follow up this call. He did not know that 22 there was only one ambulance at Hillsborough or how many 23 ambulance officers there were or where in the ground 24 they were. He agreed with Ms Gallagher that there was 25 no comparison between the numbers of SYMAS officers at</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 54</p>	<p>1 word "Catastrophe" might have resulted in a different 2 response from SYMAS. A clearer message might have. But 3 they had officers on the ground. Mr Edmundson said he 4 could not understand why SYMAS could not assess what 5 ambulances they needed straight away. 6 Members of the jury, if you turn on, please, to 7 page 8 and the second entry, 15:09, HQ to Hillsborough, 8 and it says: 9 "Seeking authorisation for Operation Support." 10 Of course they'd put out the call for 11 Operation Support. The response is: 12 "ACC is with us at present. Yeah, from ACC, 13 authorisation given." 14 So that is obviously Mr Jackson, Assistant Chief 15 Constable Jackson, giving the formal authorisation. 16 If you go down, please, to the last entry, still 17 15:09, a little later on, Chief Inspector Edmundson to 18 an SYP officer. This is the bottom of page 8, members 19 of the jury, the last entry on page 8: 20 "Yes. It's diabolical, we've hundreds of injured, 21 sir." 22 So he's obviously talking to a senior officer: 23 "It's happened at Leppings Lane. We've authorised 24 Operation Support. They want as many ambulances as they 25 can get and I'm going to call out the Casualty Bureau</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 56</p>

<p>1 because no doubt we'll get a lot of phone calls at any 2 time." 3 So this is 9 minutes past 3, members of the jury. 4 The decision to open the Casualty Bureau suggested, 5 did it not, an incident with multiple casualties? 6 If you would be good enough, please, to turn on to 7 page 11 and the last entry. This is again from the 8 operations room, headquarters, to the mobiles: 9 "All mobiles attending operational support, to go to 10 the police room, all mobiles attending operational 11 support rendezvous at the police room, Sheffield 12 Wednesday Football Club." 13 Members of the jury, I previously drew your 14 attention, and I mention it in passing, this immediately 15 follows the entry where PC Bichard asks headquarters for 16 the fire service to be contacted, and says they want 17 hydraulic cutting equipment to the ground to cut some of 18 the metal fences. 19 As to that entry, Mr Edmundson agreed that this 20 suggested not a problem outside the ground, but 21 a problem inside the ground. He had not been aware of 22 that before. Had he been aware, he said, of people 23 being crushed against fences, he would have taken steps 24 to obtain cutting equipment without a request from the 25 control box.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 57</p>	<p>1 Over the page, please, members of the jury, and the 2 top entry. It is now the operations room to the 3 Northern General Hospital: 4 "Hello, Northern General." 5 Then the operations room: 6 "Hello, the Northern General, it's the South 7 Yorkshire Police operations room here. 8 "Yes. 9 "It's Mrs Guthrie speaking, it's just to inform you 10 that there's been an accident at the Hillsborough 11 football ground, and to put you on standby for 12 casualties. There's quite a few people injured, 13 apparently. 14 "Righty-ho, love. 15 "Who am I speaking to, please? 16 "Switchboard, Lee. 17 "It's Lee on the switchboard. 18 "That's right." 19 No doubt she's indicating to someone else who it is 20 on the switchboard. 21 Members of the jury, if we move on, I'm just 22 concentrating on limited entries to try and -- to see we 23 can get the picture as it unfolds, and if you turn to 24 page 15. There is obviously a lot of SYMAS traffic 25 that's recorded by Raca. If we go down on page 15 to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 59</p>
<p>1 They were aware of injuries, but not of crushing. 2 Mr Edmundson said they were communicating by telephone 3 as well as by radio at the time. 4 Over the page, please, members of the jury, the top 5 entry, SYP headquarters, Mr or Ms, it is not absolutely 6 clear which, Webster, and Chief Inspector Edmundson to 7 the fire service. So we are now at 15:13 to 15:14: 8 "Can we have cutting equipment, please, to 9 Hillsborough straight away?" 10 Then the operator at the fire service obtains the 11 address, the football ground, Penistone Road, and 12 Ms Webster states that it is a major incident inside the 13 ground but does not know exactly what it is. She 14 confirms they want all the cutting gear. Mr Edmundson 15 says: 16 "There's been a major accident at Hillsborough 17 football ground where the semi-final is. The crowds 18 have forced their way in. They've broken the fences and 19 gates down. I don't know exactly what it is, but there 20 are people trapped." 21 Mr Edmundson said that that reflected the 22 understanding in the operations room as to what was 23 happening at Hillsborough. He said he had no idea why 24 "Catastrophe" was not used when contacting the fire 25 service.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 58</p>	<p>1 the fourth entry, please, we are now at 17 minutes 2 past 3. This is PC Ryan in the police control box at 3 Hillsborough to headquarters: 4 "... can you start the incident log? Casualty 5 Inquiry Bureau, both hospitals. Staff are required at 6 those locations. 7 "SYP headquarters: Roger. Incident log, 8 Casualty Bureau. 10-7 after that, over. 9 "PC Ryan: Yeah, Casualty Bureau. They will require 10 staff at those hospitals. There are a lot of 11 casualties." 12 Mr Edmundson could not explain why the control box 13 was not asked to explain what they were dealing with. 14 Page 23, please, members of the jury. I am just 15 going to pick up the second entry, before concentrating 16 on the third. The second entry is 17 Chief Inspector McRobbie calling SYP headquarters, 18 Police Constable Watt in the operations room. 19 I referred to this bit of evidence yesterday: 20 "Can you get Chief Superintendent Addis, CID, 21 contact him, I believe he's at home, and ask him to 22 attend Hillsborough football ground, to the police 23 control room, please?" 24 Mr Watt says: 25 "Okay ..."</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 60</p>

<p>1 The next entry, SYP Hillsborough to SYP 2 headquarters, the operations room: 3 "We would like major incident bureau setting up at 4 headquarters, major incident bureau, headquarters. We 5 would like medical teams and staff, medical teams and 6 staff for the ground. 7 "Operator: Roger. Major incident bureau set up at 8 headquarters. Medical teams at the ground." 9 Members of the jury, page 24, please, and the last 10 entry, PC Bichard at Hillsborough to headquarters: 11 "Yes XS, XS, from Hillsborough ground control. We 12 can confirm there are fatalities at this location." 13 We are now at 3.26. That was the first confirmation 14 of fatalities. Page 25, please, members of the jury, 15 the fourth entry, SYP Hillsborough to SYP headquarters: 16 "XS, XS, Hillsborough ground control. 17 "Control, go ahead. 18 "Police officer: Yeah, from Hillsborough ground 19 control. Could you ask for the Radio Hallam [local 20 Sheffield radio, presumably] request to put out 21 a request to put out an application or a -- yeah, stand 22 by -- yeah, requesting doctors to attend at the stadium, 23 doctors at the stadium. 24 "Ground control, roger. Request on Radio Hallam for 25 doctors to attend at the stadium, over?."</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 61</p>	<p>1 "PC Bichard: Yeah, from Hillsborough ground control. 2 I know I asked earlier, but is there a senior ambulance 3 officer who could attend the police control room to 4 liaise with the fire service and the ACC [assistant 5 chief constable]? 6 "Roger. We passed that to ambulance earlier. They 7 said they were going to get somebody on their way." 8 Members of the jury, over the page, second entry. 9 Again, headquarters, this time headquarters to SYMAS: 10 "[We're] seeking a further update on the request for 11 a senior officer to attend the police box." 12 So this is the operations room talking to the 13 ambulance service: 14 "We're trying to get hold of him now. 15 "Did you put the emergency incident through? 16 "Yes. 17 "Does that mean we're having doctors on the way 18 here? 19 "Yes, we have. 20 "I can just tell you were ... doctors to the 21 Leppings Lane end to 3 badly injured." 22 Members of the jury, that's the evidence so far that 23 I am going to take you through on the Racial transcript 24 in the context of Mr Edmundson's evidence. We shall 25 come back, obviously, to the Racial recordings when</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 63</p>
<p>1 Mr Edmundson said that that was to arrange an appeal 2 over the public radio station for doctors. He said he 3 was following what should have been done in the major 4 incident plan. He made sure he contacted the various 5 bodies concerned. 6 Page 28, please, members of the jury, the entry at 7 the bottom of the page. Mr Bichard, PC Bichard, to 8 headquarters: 9 "Operator: Ground control, go ahead. 10 "PC Bichard: Ground control. Could you contact 11 ambulance service? Would like their senior officer to 12 attend the control box at Leppings Lane, control box at 13 Leppings Lane to liaise, over." 14 Members of the jury, I think I am right in saying 15 that this was the first request by the police control 16 box at Hillsborough for a senior SYMAS officer to 17 attend. Mr Edmundson said he would have been concerned 18 if the senior officers or the liaison officers between 19 South Yorkshire Police and SYMAS had not been in touch 20 with each other by half past 3. 21 Page 34, please. Entry at the bottom of the page. 22 Just give me one moment, members of the jury. I may 23 have a mistaken entry here. Let me just check. The 24 third entry, do forgive me. Again, Mr Bichard from 25 Hillsborough to the headquarters:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 62</p>	<p>1 looking at SYMAS, and possibly on other occasions. 2 Mr Edmundson said this to Operation Resolve about 3 the position in the operations room, that they "... were 4 blind and on receiving instructions or requests from 5 match control we acted immediately. I did try and guess 6 the ambulances to try and pre-empt things that were 7 going to happen, but I don't know if I could have done 8 it any quicker." 9 Calling a major incident. Mr Edmundson accepted 10 that in the very early minutes of the disaster, as he 11 became aware that they were dealing potentially with 12 very many casualties, the failure to declare a major 13 incident and use the word "Catastrophe" may well have 14 lost some time in terms of the response of the fire 15 service. He said the ambulance service was at the 16 scene. He agreed that the operations room/incident room 17 staff were effectively blind or working on rumour for 18 quite a long time. Little was done to establish from 19 the police control box precisely what had happened. He 20 agreed that the calling of operational support might 21 result in a lot of police vehicles turning up at the 22 stadium. He agreed with Mr Weatherby that it would have 23 been strange to declare a major incident without at 24 least talking to Chief Superintendent Duckenfield. He 25 said:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 64</p>

16 (Pages 61 to 64)

<p>1 "There is a hierarchy in the police service and 2 police under ranks are very reluctant to make a decision 3 whether there is a senior officer present without 4 speaking to him". He agreed that made the present 5 situation different from a normal major incident. 6 He agreed that at 14:59, 2.59, he had the following 7 information: a number of communications of increasing 8 alarm from Mr Marshall; mention of crushing; a possible 9 wall collapsing; an order to open the gates; a request 10 to deploy reserve serials; a request to delay the 11 kick-off. He also agreed he possibly had concerns of an 12 incident involving quite a number of injuries before 13 asking the police control box if they needed ambulances 14 at 2.49. 15 On the basis that he was the emergency planning 16 officer for South Yorkshire Police, Mr Weatherby asked 17 Mr Edmundson a number of hypothetical questions, having 18 shown him a photograph taken at 2.59. Members of the 19 jury, this will not be the first time that we have 20 looked at the photograph and it will not be the last. 21 May we have that on screen, please, Jyo? It is 22 SYP000157350004. Thank you. We will keep that up, if 23 we may, for the moment. 24 On the basis of that photograph, and entirely 25 hypothetically, Mr Edmundson agreed with the suggestion</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 65</p>	<p>1 experience of policing football matches by 1989. He had 2 also considerable experience, he said, of public order 3 policing generally. 4 He had been ground commander at Hillsborough in 5 1988. That, of course, was the role fulfilled by 6 Superintendent Greenwood in 1989. He said that by 1989, 7 he was "well used to the ground. I knew the ground 8 well. I'd been there a lot and I'd policed lots of 9 matches there". He said that he was familiar with the 10 layout, including the layout of the Leppings Lane 11 turnstile area and the inner and outer concourses. 12 Before the 1989 semi-final, he said he was aware of 13 the safety certificate. He said he was aware it 14 prescribed specific safe capacities for the 15 Leppings Lane terrace and the north-west terrace. He 16 was unaware of the specific capacities prescribed in the 17 safety certificate. 18 He said of the 1981 crushing that it would have been 19 helpful to have been told what happened in 1981, 20 although, of course, members of the jury, you will 21 recall the arrangement of the pens in 1981 was very 22 different from that in 1989. 23 Mr Marshall agreed that Leppings Lane was something 24 of a bottleneck. The area in front of the turnstiles 25 was relatively confined. There was relatively little</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 67</p>
<p>1 that the police control box should have called a major 2 incident at 14:59, 2.59, with consequences that would 3 follow. Had they done so, he agreed that he would have 4 implemented the police major incident plan. He would 5 have contacted the ambulance service and the fire 6 service without delay. He would have used the codeword 7 "Catastrophe". He agreed with Mr Weatherby that he 8 would have expected them to "swing into action". 9 Mr Edmundson said he thought any person could have 10 called a major incident. It was everybody's job. Thank 11 you, Jyo. 12 Members of the jury, I am now going to turn to the 13 evidence of the senior officers. I shall, in each case, 14 take their evidence as a piece. In other words, not 15 breaking it up to different aspects of their evidence, 16 as I have done with other witnesses. 17 Former Superintendent Marshall was 71 when he gave 18 evidence in September 2014. On 15 April, he was 19 a superintendent in F Division. He had joined the 20 police as a cadet in 1960. He rose through the ranks. 21 Between 1977 and 1980, he worked as an inspector in 22 F Division. At that time, he had policed the area 23 around the Leppings Lane turnstiles. He then worked in 24 other divisions before returning to F Division in 1987. 25 He was by then a superintendent. He had considerable</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 66</p>	<p>1 room for the crowd to spread out, having gone through 2 the outer perimeter gates. There was the potential for 3 congestion, particularly if the service road was 4 barriered off. Before the disaster, he did not think 5 that the number of turnstiles was insufficient. He did 6 not think about it at all. He later learnt about the 7 flow rate of 750 people per hour, as set out in the 8 Green Guide, after the disaster. He did not think flow 9 rates had previously been a problem at any match in 10 which he was involved. He agreed that, in the event, 11 there were too few turnstiles at Leppings Lane. 12 He was asked about the Calvert memo of 11 June 1986. 13 Members of the jury, we have looked at this I think 14 twice. It is set out in two of the chronologies that 15 you have. I don't think we need remind ourselves of 16 the detail of it, but it is the memo that Mr Calvert 17 wrote on 11 June 1986 in which he said: 18 "One of the greatest problems we have is access to 19 the ground, particularly at the Leppings Lane end. The 20 redesigned turnstiles do not give anything like the 21 access to the ground either on the Leppings Lane 22 terraces or in the west stand, needed by away fans ..." 23 And the observation that "On occasions last 24 season" -- we are talking about 11 June 1986: 25 "On occasions last season when large numbers</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 68</p>

<p>1 attended, we had away supporters who were justifiably 2 irate because of the inefficiency of the system which 3 was turned on the police and could have resulted in 4 public disorder." 5 You will remember that Calvert memo to Mr Mole. 6 Mr Marshall agreed that the fact that that memo was not 7 passed on to him was not "good communication". 8 Mr Marshall said that he thought Hillsborough was 9 a good stadium. He said he had never witnessed 10 a problem in terms of the ease with which fans got into 11 the stadium. He was not concerned about the absence of 12 dedicated turnstiles for dedicated pens, and many others 13 shared his view. The police knew how many turnstiles 14 had been allocated to the Liverpool fans. He agreed 15 that if they were unhappy, they could have taken steps 16 to stop the match taking place. 17 He was asked about signage. He said before the 18 disaster he considered it adequate. On the day of 19 the disaster, it was "rather poor". That only occurred 20 to him in 1989 when fans continually asked which 21 turnstile they had to access. He thought the area of 22 the terrace behind the goal was a popular vantage point 23 for many fans, and we heard a lot of evidence to that 24 effect. 25 Time of arrival of fans. Mr Marshall said there</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 69</p>	<p>1 ticket holders had actually got into the stadium that 2 "You find out you have a crowd of maybe 100/150 outside 3 who don't have a ticket". He said he saw fans outside 4 asking for spares. He said to Mr Weatherby that he 5 could not say one way or the other whether ticketless 6 fans played any part in the events of 1989. We know, 7 members of the jury, from Mr Cutlack's unchallenged 8 evidence, that the number of fans who entered the 9 turnstiles for the west stand, the west terrace and the 10 north-west terrace, by the time of the disaster, was no 11 more than the number of tickets that were sold for those 12 areas. 13 Mr Marshall agreed he saw one ticket tout only. At 14 the debriefing of 16 April, which I shall come to in 15 more detail, he had spoken of between 200 and 250 16 ticketless supporters. He agreed that was an 17 insignificant amount among a crowd of 24,000. 18 Police strategies for managing a football crowd. 19 Mr Marshall said the key strategy in the late 1970s and 20 the 1980s was segregating supporters. He said: 21 "Football was in a fairly parlous state in terms of 22 hooliganism." 23 Training. Mr Marshall agreed with Mr Greaney that 24 he had a role of very considerable importance in terms 25 of policing and crowd control and safety. He agreed</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 71</p>
<p>1 were always a small number of fans who came in in the 2 last 10 or 15 minutes. They had been to the pub. They 3 usually came in a hurry to get in for kick-off. 4 He told the Taylor Inquiry that he had not foreseen 5 the possibility of a problem at Leppings Lane if too 6 many people arrived at once. He said to us: 7 "If the people arrive at the same time ... they are 8 good humoured; they are compliant with police 9 instructions; they are happy people and they are not 10 drunk, then there is no problem because they will queue 11 and they will do as the police ask them to do ... the 12 phenomenon of people arriving late at a football ground 13 is well known ... but those people are not drunk; they 14 are not argumentative; they are compliant, happy people 15 and they will do what the police ask for them and they 16 do not present a problem." 17 Mr Marshall said to us he would not expect a large 18 number of people to arrive as late as 2.50 or 2.55 pm. 19 He agreed that fans who arrived shortly before kick-off 20 would be keen to get into the stadium so as not to miss 21 the kick-off. 22 Fans without tickets. Mr Marshall said there would, 23 at any major football match, be a component of the crowd 24 without tickets. Such a fan going from one turnstile to 25 another would cause delay. He said it was only when the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 70</p>	<p>1 that in hindsight it was unsatisfactory -- he finally 2 agreed unacceptable -- that he had not received any 3 training in crowd safety that he could remember. Such 4 a situation as happened on 15 April at a football ground 5 was not envisaged. He agreed with Ms Barton that such 6 training as was given by the South Yorkshire Police was 7 no different from that given by other forces. 8 Delaying the kick-off. He said: 9 "I could certainly have requested a delay of 10 the kick-off. I can tell you that it is one of the most 11 profound regrets of my experience at Leppings Lane on 12 15 April that I did not do so." 13 He said Mr Duckenfield's policy was that, if there 14 had been fog on the Pennines or a serious accident which 15 would have resulted in "very, very large numbers of 16 people being delayed, then for that reason kick-off 17 would be delayed". He thought it would have been 18 possible to seek a delay in the kick-off, given the 19 numbers that were besieging the turnstiles at 2.40 and 20 2.45. He agreed that an announcement of delaying the 21 kick-off would or might alleviate the anxiety and 22 frustration of those trying to get in. 23 He said, with hindsight, he should have called for 24 the kick-off to be delayed. The opportunity to do so 25 was at around 2.35 pm, maybe just after. He agreed with</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 72</p>

<p>1 Ms Williams that 2.45 would not have been too late. He 2 "guessed" that had officers been instructed to tell the 3 crowd that the kick-off had been delayed, word would 4 have got round. He agreed that delaying the kick-off 5 was not about being nice to the fans, it was about 6 safety, but not entirely so. The absence of an obvious 7 reason for not getting in was no reason to ignore the 8 obvious safety concern, he said.</p> <p>9 Opening the exit gates. Mr Marshall said there was 10 no policy about opening the exit gates to allow fans in 11 in any circumstances. To his recollection, he had never 12 given an instruction that exit gates should be opened to 13 allow fans entry to the ground.</p> <p>14 Preparation for the match. The match commander. 15 Mr Marshall described Chief Superintendent Mole as an 16 extremely capable football commander. He described 17 Chief Superintendent Duckenfield as a "steady, good 18 police officer". He agreed it was good practice for the 19 match commanders to take a roving role. Mr Mole did 20 that. Mr Greaney suggested to Mr Marshall that it was 21 not good practice for Mr Duckenfield to remain during 22 the critical period at all times in the police control 23 box. Mr Marshall said that he could not "honestly" 24 answer that question. In the period up to 2 pm, he 25 thought it was good to be out and about seeing what was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 73</p>	<p>1 parts reduced into a miniature version so he could carry 2 it about. He had the ticket colour coding added for his 3 own benefit. He did not think at the time the order was 4 deficient. It was based on the 1988 order. In his 5 view, 1988, he said, had been a success. The only 6 problem had been that some Liverpool fans were in the 7 Spion Kop, which he sorted out. He said he'd heard 8 nothing about any congestion at Leppings Lane.</p> <p>9 Mr Marshall said he was not aware of the tunnel 10 being closed in 1988. He said to us he did not 11 necessarily think it would have been reported to him or 12 to Mr Mole in the police control box. He would have 13 expected Inspector White to have taken that sort of 14 measure. He said police use their initiative.</p> <p>15 He told the Taylor Inquiry in May 1989 that he would 16 have expected to learn if the police closed the tunnel 17 in 1988. He agreed with us that that was so. It should 18 then have been included in the 1988 debriefing. It 19 would then have been important to be able to reflect it 20 in the 1989 operational order.</p> <p>21 Mr Marshall said he did not remember going to the 22 debriefing in 1988. If there had been congestion on the 23 terrace or the entrance to the tunnel had been closed 24 for some reason, either by junior officers doing it of 25 their own initiative or as a result of an instruction</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 75</p>
<p>1 happening. It might have been a good idea for 2 Mr Duckenfield to have gone to Leppings Lane and the 3 inner concourse after 2.30 pm to see what was happening 4 there with his own eyes. He agreed that different 5 senior officers could hold equally respectable different 6 views as to whether it was appropriate or not to spend 7 most of the time in the police control box, as opposed 8 to going out and about. He finally said: 9 "... with the benefit of hindsight, it was probably 10 not the best practice [to remain in the police control 11 box]."</p> <p>12 The allocation of ends. Mr Marshall said that the 13 allocation of ends did not give him cause for concern. 14 It was geographically correct. He had no power to do 15 anything about it. As I understood his evidence, it was 16 that segregation trumped any other concerns.</p> <p>17 The operational order and contingency planning. 18 Mr Marshall had no involvement in the drawing up of 19 the operational order. He did not think, he said, that 20 Chief Inspector Brayford had either. He said, and 21 I mention it, really, only in passing, that Mr Brayford 22 was transferred from F Division because of an 23 inappropriate relationship with a civilian employee. 24 Mr Marshall said he studied the order very carefully. 25 He marked it with his own notes. He had the relevant</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 74</p>	<p>1 from a senior officer, it should have been reported at 2 the debriefing.</p> <p>3 He agreed that if the closure of the tunnel had 4 emerged during the debriefing, then, when the 1989 5 operational order was drafted, the job of monitoring the 6 pen should have been prescribed in the order.</p> <p>7 A serial would have been detailed whose duties 8 included blocking the tunnel in certain circumstances. 9 It could have referred to the possibility of 10 Inspector White or his sergeant, who was 11 Sergeant Crawford, closing off the tunnel by creating 12 a cordon of police officers or using temporary barriers. 13 There could be no question, he said, of closing the 14 tunnel gates because exit via the tunnel would have been 15 required for emergencies. Mr Marshall also thought that 16 the job of monitoring the pens should have featured in 17 the operational order.</p> <p>18 He agreed with Mr Weatherby that having pens without 19 dedicated entrances was potentially dangerous. It 20 should have been covered in the operational order. So, 21 too, should the responsibility of the police to 22 supervise, monitor and close off the tunnel. This 23 should have been, as he put it, "spelled out".</p> <p>24 There should, too, have been a contingency plan to 25 deal with large numbers of people outside the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 76</p>

1 turnstiles. He agreed with Mr Weatherby there was no
 2 plan to have the outer perimeter gates closed from the
 3 outset to try to prevent congestion occurring. When
 4 they ultimately were closed, it was, in hindsight, too
 5 little too late.

6 Mr Marshall agreed with Mr Wilcock that the only
 7 provision in the operational order to prevent
 8 overcrowding at the Leppings Lane turnstiles was that
 9 relating to orderly queues. There was nothing about the
 10 need to keep an eye on the numbers outside the
 11 turnstiles.

12 Four of the serials, 16 to 19, responsible for
 13 turnstiles A to G were under Superintendent Greenwood's
 14 direct command in the order, but in practice were under
 15 Mr Marshall's command. You will recall that, members of
 16 the jury. We have looked at it, and it is something
 17 about which there were quite a number of questions.

18 Mr Marshall said that varying the chain of command
 19 might have contributed to the failure to establish
 20 orderly queues, but Inspector Creaser, to whom he spoke,
 21 was present and had the initial responsibility.

22 Mr Creaser, he said, had considerable experience in
 23 the Leppings Lane turnstile area. Mr Marshall said to
 24 Mr Weatherby that it did not occur to him after the 1988
 25 match to tell Mr Mole that the operational order was

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1 wrong and confusing regarding the command outside the
 2 Leppings Lane end. Had Superintendent Greenwood been
 3 involved when gate C was being opened, he would have
 4 expected him to have taken an overview of what was
 5 happening both outside the turnstiles and inside the
 6 concourse and direct officers accordingly.

7 Members of the jury, we will take our break a little
 8 earlier, as I foreshadowed. Could we please resume --
 9 would 1.35 pm be all right? Thank you very much.

10 (12.45 pm)

11 (The short adjournment)

12 I N D E X

13

14 Summing-up (continued)1

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